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FEDERALISM AND THE CONTRIVANCES
OF PUBLIC LAW
PAUL BOUDREAUXt
INTRODUCTION

The specter of federalism is stalking public law. Through its
recent resuscitation of constitutional limitations on Congress's
power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, 1 the United
States Supreme Court appears amenable, for the first time in
generations, to striking down a range of public welfare laws.
Most recently, the Rehnquist Court wielded the blunt side of its
federalist ax in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) 2 to strike
down on statutory grounds a major component of the Federal
Clean Water Act. 3 Although SWANCC has been underestimated
in the shadow of the more straightforward Commerce Clause
holdings in United States v. Lopez, 4 which overturned a minor
federal gun law, 5 and United States v. Morrison,6 which struck
7
down a limited federal civil statute on violence against women,
SWANCC is arguably more significant in that it marked the first
time that a major federal statutory regime felt the sting of the
Rehnquist Court's restrictive new federalism.
Some advocates of broad national power comfort themselves
with the thought that the Rehnquist Court is finished with its
t Assistant Professor, Stetson University College of Law.
I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2 531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC].
3 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (2000). The Army announced on January 15, 2003, that it was
beginning a rule making process to amend its regulations and the definition of
"navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act. See Army's Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Waters of
the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991-98 (proposed Jan. 15, 2003).
4 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
5 See id. at 551.
6 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
7 See id. at 601-02.
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new federalism, in part because the Court in SWANCC
technically stopped just short of reaching the constitutional
issue.8 By contrast, I maintain that the Rehnquist Court has
positioned itself to take aim at a range of public welfare statutes,
from environmental legislation to laws outlawing race and sex
discrimination.
To understand fully the bases and implications of the
Rehnquist Court's new federalism, it is necessary to
acknowledge and understand what I call the contrivances at
issue in many public welfare laws and their judicial review. The
first two of the four contrivances concern the federal
government's creation of statutory regimes. The contrivance of
motivation arises when the government concocts arguments that
its public welfare laws, such as the water pollution law in
SWANCC 9 or statutes against racial discrimination, 10 somehow
fall within the regulation of interstate commerce, as opposed to
being simply vindications of modern conceptions of a fair and
just society. Relatedly, the contrivance of construction arises
when zealous drafters or agency administrators expand
unnaturally the scope of a statutory regime. These contrivances
raise the ire of federalist jurists, as shown by the Rehnquist
Court's disapproval in SWANCC.
The third and fourth contrivances arise from the Supreme
Court's federalist jurisprudence. The Rehnquist Court's new
federalism threatens--or promises, if you prefer-to return
constitutional law to the so-called dual federalism of the early
twentieth century," in which certain realms of human activity
were held to be off-limits to national legislation, regardless of
potential links between the law and interstate commerce. 12 A

8 Professor Calvin Massey, for example, has described Lopez and Morrison as
"abberational and anomalous." CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

183 (2001).
9 SWANCC concerned section 404 of the Clean Water Act-33 U.S.C. § 1344
(2000).
10 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62
(1964) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting discrimination
against motel customers); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964)
(holding constitutional the national regulation of discrimination against restaurant
customers).
11 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (concluding that
Congress cannot regulate child labor because employment is "purely local in its
character").
12 Before 1937, the Supreme Court struck down much, but not all, of the
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full-scale revival of this doctrine would imperil not only much of
federal environmental law but also anti-discrimination law,
labor standards, and much of what progressives think of as the
essentials of social legislation. The fundamental flaw in the
Rehnquist Court's new jurisprudence is that so far it is only a
contrivance of dual federalism, in which the line between
national and state realms is drawn merely by the Court's
perception of tradition, which makes little sense as a matter of
logic, precedent, or history.
Finally, the contrivance of libertarianism arises from the
federalist assumption that constraining the national government
will result in more freedom. Although the role of libertarianism
in the new federalism might seem obvious, it has failed to
achieve the prominence that it deserves in either the
jurisprudence or in the commentary 13 -in large part because
advocacy of libertarianism is difficult to justify as a principle of
constitutional interpretation.
Explicit recognition of the contrivances surrounding
federalism may lead to better statutory construction and better
constitutional jurisprudence. In this Article, I focus on two fields
of social legislation-environmental laws and antidiscrimination
statutes-because they are among the broadest of today's public
welfare regimes. Acknowledging the vulnerabilities of statutory
creation would assist Congress and agencies in drafting and
administering more stable and ultimately more effective public
laws. The conclusion of this Article proposes some potential
solutions to the current federalist quagmire. The solutions range
from relatively modest ideas, such as reworking agency
interpretations to better explain the links to interstate
commerce, to bolder proposals, such as explicitly grounding
congressional power in unenumerated powers or a constitutional
amendment. These new paths for nationalism would help build
a more satisfying and sustainable constitutional foundation for
the nation's public welfare laws.

progressive social legislation of Congress. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238, 308-310 (1936) (striking down law regulating employment conditions for
miners).
13 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, TranslatingFederalism:A Structural Approach,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161, 1187-97 (1998) (arguing in part that the issues of
federalism revolve largely around the fear of national commandeering of states).
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I. BOTH A UNION AND A NATION:
FEDERALISM VERSUS NATIONALISM

The Supreme Court has held for nearly two centuries that
Congress holds only those powers specifically granted to it under
the Constitution;1 4 the constitutional structure of the United
States creates both a single nation and a union of sovereign
states. 15 During the twentieth century, however, the Court
honored the limitations on central government more in theory
than in practice. From laws regulating sexual liaisons 16 to
occupational safety legislation" to the landscaping of closed
strip-mines, 8 Congress has enacted social legislation that has
little to do with dictionary or commonsense notions of
"commerce," or that which is interstate. It was once, and is now
again, the challenge of the central government to fit the range of
congressional legislation within the supposed confines of this
constitutional power.
Advocates of both states-oriented
federalism and what I call nationalism 19-to which my own
inclinations tend-have marshaled arguments of political theory
that are worth reassessing before moving to today's
jurisprudence.

14 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); see also
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 551, 552 (1995) (referring to Congress's "few and
defined" powers (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
15 Because the constitutional structure of the United States creates both a
single nation and a union of sovereign states, the appropriate division of power
between the national government and the states has been the main policy debate in
American history. The most shattering manifestation of this debate, the American
Civil War, resulted in the most significant advance for the national cause. As many
have stated, perhaps more symbolically than accurately, this war changed the
United States from an "are" to an "is." See, e.g., Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing
Federalizationof Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 825, 831 & n.40 (2000).
16 See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding law that regulated
interstate prostitution).
17 See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000)) (regulating health and
safety at work for nearly all employees).
18 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 283-93
(1981) (upholding federal regulation of landscaping of closed strip-mines).
19 In everyday speech it is common to refer to the government based in
Washington as the "federal" government; however, because the advocates of limited
national power are today called "federalists," in this Article, I use the less confusing
term "national government" and "nationalists" to refer to advocates of resting
authority in Congress and the President.
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Federalism

There should be no doubt that the eighteenth-century
framers of the United States Constitution believed in a division
of powers between the national government and those of the
states. 20 This system, which today we call federalism, 21 remains
the building block of how we think about government in the
United States. Nonetheless, the drafters probably would be
astounded by the twentieth century's explosion in the reach of
the central government.
From pollution laws that tell
manufacturers how to build factories 22 to anti-discrimination
statutes that prescribe the grounds on which an employer can
hire and fire, 23 today's national laws cover a wide territory,
especially in the spheres of commercial and business activity.
This is not to say that state and local governments have been
eclipsed. For many of life's most common personal activitiesgoing to school, buying a house, marrying, and raising a familyone still encounters state law more often than national. Indeed,
a typical citizen's most frequent day-to-day encounter with the
law-the highway speed limits-has moved in the last decade
from being largely a federal command to being almost
exclusively a state and local one. 24 In fact, the past twenty years
20 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). The "Federalist Papers" were written in large part to convince
skeptics that the Constitution drafted by the 1787 Convention would not grant the
national government extreme power at the expense of the states. See generally
George W. Carey & James McClellan, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST, at xiii-liv
(George W. Carey and James McClellan eds., 2001) (explaining the history behind
the "Federalist Papers").
21 It is ironic that today's supporters of states' rights are called "federalists." In
the early days of the nation, the political party of John Adams, Alexander Hamilton,
and John Marshall, which advocated stronger powers for the national government,
was dubbed the "Federalist" Party. The party of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, who distrusted central power, was called the "Anti-Federalist,"
"Republican" or "Republican-Democratic" Party. See CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R.
BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 163-70 (1944). Professor James
Simon has recently published an entertaining book explaining how John Marshall
and the Federalists/nationalists won most of the key battles. See generally JAMES F.
SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION (2002).
22 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7503 (2000) (detailing new source
technology standards for new factories under the Clean Air Act, which include the
requirement that government authorities must approve construction plans before
the factory is built).
23 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(2000) (prohibiting race and sex discrimination in hiring and firing).
24 See Editorial, Public Pulse, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 11, 2002, at 10B
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have witnessed a revival in the idea of state authority, at least in
25
political rhetoric.
To judge from the recent judicial rhetoric, it would seem
apocalyptic that the national government could usurp

responsibility for fields such as education or family law. 26 Yet for

all the hand-wringing over excessive nationalism, little in
political science compels a reservation of powers to the states.
Some affluent nations give their national government nearly
absolute authority, 27 even if this national government in turn
voluntarily delegates administration to the provinces, just as
United States agencies such as the National Park Service
delegate most site-specific decisions to local managers, 28 and
American states typically hand over authority to counties and
cities for matters such as land use and policing. 29 There is no
inherent reason why historically local matters, such as education
or family law, could not be handled well by the national
government.
Indeed, for educational matters such as
standardized testing and for family matters such as abortion
rights, state prerogatives have yielded to national control,
largely because many citizens believe that such matters are too
important to be left to the diverse views of the states.30

(asserting that the shift from a uniform federal limit to state limits, which typically
have allowed for higher speeds, has correlated with a decrease in traffic fatalities),
available at 2002 WL 5334163.
25 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 935 (1994) (discussing and criticizing the
rise of federalist sentiment associated with the Reagan presidency and its
aftermath).
26 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) (raising the
specter that without limits, the Commerce Clause could allow the federal
government to regulate family law and other areas of traditional state regulation);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (same).
27 See, e.g., John C. Reitz, Political Economy as a Major Architectural Principle
of Public Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1121, 1145-47 (2001) (discussing the traditional
centralized form of government in France and the United Kingdom).
28 See generally DAN SHOLLY, GUARDIANS OF YELLOWSTONE (1991) (discussing

the local discretionary authority of National Park superintendents).
29 See, e.g., DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., LAND USE 3, 23-24, 36-40 (3d ed. 1999)

(discussing the authorization by states or localities to adopt their own zoning laws
pursuant to local police power).
30 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118, 138-47, 162-66 (1973) (holding
unconstitutional a state law criminalizing abortion through establishment of a
constitutional right of privacy).

2003)

THE CONTRIVANCES OFPUBLIC LAW

Let us consider some of the leading arguments in favor of a
federalist system. 3 ' First, states may serve as laboratories for
governmental experimentation. 32 Lessons learned from one
state's experience can be compared with those of other states.
Through a trial-and-error process of thesis and antithesis, a
happy synthesis can be achieved. 33 Although states do use the
trial-and-error method, it is less clear whether states compare
their approaches with those of other states in any systematic
manner. A recent example of successful state programs that
garnered nationwide attention was the so-called welfare-to-work
public assistance programs that appeared to be extraordinarily
successful in the 1990s. 34 The kicker to the story, however, is
that the most notable student of this state experiment was the
national government itself, which radically overhauled the
5
national welfare financial assistance program in 1996.3
A second argument. for a federal system is that state
36
authority is more likely to foster democratic participation.
Citizens are more likely able to speak out at a civic meeting,
shake the hand of a legislator, or visit an administrative hearing
in their state capital than in Washington. Skeptics might point
out, of course, that closeness to constituency also leaves state
31 The most destructive and traumatic experience in American history, the
Civil War, was fought, at least in southern political rhetoric, for the Confederate
States of America to pursue their "states' rights" without interference from the
national government. As was clear to many northerners, of course, the lone "state
right" over which the southern states' citizens would risk their lives was that of
slavery of African Americans. In a recent study, Professor William C. Davis has
explained that the Confederacy in practice gave few rights to its states during its
sorry four-year existence. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. DAVIS, LOOK AWAY! 323-40 (2002).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (mentioning role of states as laboratories); William H. Pryor, Jr.,
Madison's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism,the Separation of Powers, and
the Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1181 (2002) (defending the laboratory
argument).
33 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
34 See Daniel T. Lichter & Rukamalie Jayakody, Welfare Reform: How Do We
Measure Success?, 28 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 117, 117-19 (2002).
35 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 replaced the old entitlement-based Aid for Families With Dependent Children
program with the more discretionary and limited Temporary Aid for Needy
Families. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619
(2000)). See generally Alice Bers, Reforming Welfare After Welfare Reform, 36 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571 (2001).
36 See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 764-65 (1998).
Farber, Frickey, and Eskridge refer to this idea as a republicanbenefit, but I believe
that democracy is a more apt term.
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governments closer to business interests, on which they may rely
more heavily than Congress for financial and political support,
especially in places with a nondiversified economy-the so called
company town syndrome. 37
For all the opportunity for
corruption in Congress, city mayors have had an even more
unsavory record, 38 but this may be a criticism more of American
republicanism in general than of federalism per se.
The third and fourth supposed benefits of federalism
together form, in my opinion, the chief impetus to the Rehnquist
Court's revived federalism. Federalism enables variations in
local opinion to be reflected in the varied state laws.3 9 If a
majority of citizens of Kansas hold views that differ from the
views of a majority in Nebraska concerning, for example,
protections of ecologically valuable grasslands or a right against
discrimination based on sexual orientation, federalism allows for
expression of these local variations, instead of having all issues
subject to the views of a majority of the nation as a whole. In
theory, therefore, federalism allows law to reflect the views of
states that hold the minority position on a particular issue,
whether involving California's unusually tough land-use
restrictions 40 or Virginia's retention of the old doctrine of strict
contributory negligence in tort law. 41 A nationalist retort is that
variations among the states cause citizens in a minority of states
to receive fewer rights than they might under a nationalist
system. Criminal defendants who are unlucky enough to find
themselves in the Texas court system are without some
procedural protections that they would enjoy in the federal
system, 42 while beachfront landowners in Oregon find that they

37 For discussions of the company-town phenomenon, see Kenneth Casebeer,

Aliquippa: The Company Town and Contested Power in the Construction of Law, 43
BUFF. L. REV. 617, 666 (1995). See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)

(discussing a company-run town).
-3 See, e.g., Megan Glasheen, Patronage Employment Practices and the First
Amendment, 34 HOW. L. J. 663, 666 (1991) (discussing the infamous history of
corrupt big-city mayors).
.19 See, e.g., FARBER ET AL., supra note 36, at 764-65.
4o See, e.g., California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 576
(1987) (discussing California's strict coastal land-use regulations).
41 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Comerci, 563 S.E.2d 748, 752 (Va. 2002) (citing Virginia's
adherence to contributory negligence).
42 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Defending the Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999,
at A31 (summarizing the variety of difficulties facing criminal defendants in the
Texas criminal justice system).
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must allow the public to walk along the beach, even above the
43
high-tide line, unlike beachfront owners in most other states.
Depending on one's views about the relative merits of protecting
either national minority variations or local minority rights, it
seems unwise to judge either federalism or nationalism as being
44
more protective of minority viewpoints.
From the examples above, it should be plain that in some
instances, a federalist system allows for more regulation than
Nonetheless,
nationalism would and sometimes less.
commentators from Constitutional framers such as James
Madison to today's free-market advocates 45 have linked
federalism with freedom or, in today's political terminology,
libertarianism. Because libertarianism forms such an important
foundation for today's thinking about federalism, I devote Part
IV of this Article to discussing what I call the contrivance of
libertarianism in modern federalist jurisprudence.
B. Nationalism
Having surveyed briefly some of the strongest arguments for
federalism, 46 I turn to nationalism. Some advocates of broad
national power contend that the supposed benefits of federalism
47
no longer apply to today's political and economic system.
Because of the nationwide scope of today's commercial markets
and social activity, nationalists argue that a tremendous range
of laws may properly be characterized as regulation of interstate
commerce. 48 Professor Mark Tushnet, for one, once argued
43 See Neal E. Pirkle, MaintainingPublic Access to Texas Coastal Beaches: The
Past and the Future, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 1093, 1103-04 (1994) (explaining State ex
rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969)); see also Catherine E. Decker, In Re
Banning: The Hawaii Supreme Court Keeps Hawaiian Beaches Accessible, 1 OCEAN
& COASTAL L.J. 97, 97 (1994) (summarizing Hawaii's beach law).
44 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (recognizing the
unavoidable existence of minority opinions and discussing the pitfalls associated
with a republican form of government).
15 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); see also Richard Epstein,
The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1452-54 (1987).
46 The lists here are not meant to be exclusive; no doubt there are other
arguments. One of the most annoying habits of legal argumentation is to confine an
opponent's arguments to a single or limited position and then seek to defeat it
without acknowledging other points. This is a variant of the "straw man" error.
47 See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 25, at 951-52 (concluding that states
should serve the purpose of merely being administrative units of the national
government).
48 See id.
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provocatively that "everything is interstate commerce." 49 For
some nationalists, the limitation of the commerce power may be
likened to an annoying little dog that nips at the heels of
Congress-the national government cannot upset bystanders by
kicking the dog in the mouth, of course, but it must regularly
brush the mutt aside if Congress is to be able to march toward
its important work of regulating national justice.
A related nationalist argument observes that it is often more
effective for the national government to regulate an area of
concern. Put succinctly, "national problems requiref national
responses."5 0 In a widely cited article published after Lopez,
Professor Donald H. Regan argued that the constitutional
commerce power should be interpreted to allow Congress to
regulate whenever it is in the "general interests of the union" to
do so05 -a conception that in some instances would extend the
Commerce Clause beyond the Supreme Court's pre-Lopez
holdings. 52 Regan borrowed his term from a Virginia Resolution
that was initially adopted by the United States Constitutional
Convention of 1787 before the Convention finally settled on the
enumerated powers listed in Article I, including the Commerce
Clause. 53 By the term "general interests of the union," however,
Regan did not mean that Congress should be free to legislate
whenever it feels that the interests of the nation would be
served. Rather, he meant to refer to situations when there is
"some reason why we cannot leave the matter to the states."5 4
Because states are "separately incompetent" to conduct foreign
affairs, for example, Congress should be permitted to act

49 Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV.
125, 148.
50 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 45, at 1443 (characterizing New Deal attitudes);
see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935)
(stating the nationalist argument that "[e]xtraordinary conditions may call for
extraordinary remedies").
51 Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 555, 570-71
(1995).
52 Id. Professor Regan pointed out that his proposal does not call for an
unlimited concentration of national power and that in some instances, where the
practical arguments for national power are lacking, his proposal would reserve
governmental power with the states. See id. at 567, 571.
53 Id. at 555, 556 n.4 (citing NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 380 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1966)).

54 Id. at 555.
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whenever a matter seriously implicates foreign relations. 55
Regan even suggested that the Civil Rights Act of 196456 was
justified by its role in improving relations with foreign nations
that were assessing the relative moral stances of the United
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War 57-an
argument that I think holds at least as much power as the
strained interstate commerce argument that the Supreme Court
accepted in Katzenbach v. McClung,58 which upheld key aspects
59
of the statute.
A fundamental problem with practical proposals for
nationalism, such as Regan's, is that they are difficult to
reconcile with the legal text of the Constitution. It might have
been a fine idea to advise James Madison and the conventioneers
of 1787 to give Congress the power to regulate for the "general
interests of the union," but the fact is that the drafters did not
choose the language of the Virginia Resolution; they chose
instead to authorize regulation of "[c]ommerce ... among the
several States"6 0 and other enumerated powers. For those who
rely on the text to start constitutional interpretation, the
practical approach seems at odds with the words of the
document. To the extent, however, that a pragmatic approach
might garner widespread support, Regan's suggestion might
form the basis for a constitutional change, an idea to which I
return at the end of this Article.
Moreover, many nationalist proposals do not address
adequately a criticism that oozes from the Rehnquist Court's
opinions-a skepticism of the national government's assertions
of links between its laws and interstate commerce. For example,
when presented in Morrison with explicit congressional findings
that violence against women hindered interstate commerce, the
Court rejected deference to the legislature: "If accepted, [the
government's] reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any

55 Id. at 555-56, 583-86 (identifying the regulation of wheat prices and the
establishment of a worker minimum wage as other matters in which the states are
"separately incompetent").
56 Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (1964).
57 See Regan, supra note 51, at 602.
58 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
59 See id. at 304-05.

60 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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crime" and "might... obliterate the Constitution's distinction
6 1
between national and local authority."
Speaking of distrust, perhaps the most commonly expressed
nationalist argument is that states cannot be entrusted to enact
worthy social legislation because of the pressures of unhealthy
competition with other states. Environmentalists often call it a
"race to the bottom," in which states compete with each other for
lax regulation of business, knowing that businesses are likely to
be more mobile than labor.6 2 An economic variant is called the
prisoner's
dilemma,
in
which
multiple
criminal
defendants--analogs to the states-would like to cooperate to
achieve a mutually beneficial result but are prevented from
doing so and end up working against their own interests out of
fear that one is going to sell out the others. 63 The result is that
worthy state social legislation is defeated. Tied to the railroad
tracks by dastardly competition, the states can be rescued only
by the federal government, arriving on a white horse named the
64
Commerce Clause.
There is considerable skepticism among economists,
particularly those of the libertarian bent, however, as to the
reality and extent of the supposedly destructive race-to-thebottom. 65 Because environmental protection or consumer safety
61 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000). Similarly, the Court in
SWANCC dismissed almost offhandedly the government's argument for deference to
administrative interpretations under the Chevron doctrine. 531 U.S. at 172 (citing
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). "Where an
administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress'
power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result," the Court in
SWANCC sniffed. Id.
62 See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a
"Race"andis it 'To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 375 (1997) (concluding that
many state legislators are fearful of discouraging business); see also PAUL KANTOR,
THE DEPENDENT CITY 172-73 (1988) (arguing that impoverished city governments
must incessantly seek to please both business and its state government in order to
attract dollars).
63 See Regan, supra note 51, at 583-86; see also PAUL A. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS 506-07 (10th ed. 1976). A variant in land use is the "tragedy of the
commons." See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1243-44 (1968).
64 See Regan, supra note 51, at 583-86 (arguing that only the federal
government can allow states to achieve their regulatory goals when faced with a
prisoner's dilemma).
G5 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge
to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 207-08 (2001) (arguing that "[tihere is
little reason to believe that interstate competition amongst states will produce a
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laws are popular with voters, the skeptics maintain, fear of
competition is little reason for states to refrain from enacting
worthy social legislation. 66 There should be no doubt, of course,
that companies often seek out limited regulation and low wages
as part of their choice of where to locate. 67 Regardless of the
proof of the theory, however, it has made its way to the front of
the legal arguments for nationalism. In SWANCC, for example,
the four-justice dissent written by Justice Stevens asserted that
broad federal regulation of the nation's waters was necessary to
avoid "destructive interstate competition." 68 This term was
borrowed from a Burger Court opinion upholding national
regulation of strip-mining practices, 69 and it has been repeated
in appellate opinions rejecting federalist challenges to
application of the Endangered Species Act 70 to species that are
71
found in only one state.
'race-to-the-bottom' in environmental regulation today"); see also Engel, supra note
62, at 353-54 (concluding that as a general matter businessmen do not follow
deregulation, but many legislators think that they do).
66 See Adler, supra note 65, at 207-08.
G7 See, e.g., Mary Jordan, Mexican Workers Pay for Success; With Labor Costs
Rising, FactoriesDepartfor Asia, WASH. POST, June 20, 2002, at Al (reporting that
rising wages in Mexico are leading some companies to relocate jobs to lower-wage
countries in Asia).
68 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 196 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hodel
v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981)). Professor
Adler has rather easily dismantled Stevens' citation and logic in many areas, which
I take as evidence that Justices and their clerks should do their homework before
delving into economic analysis. See Adler, supra note 65, at 222-25.
69 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-82
(1981) ("[P]revention of... destructive interstate competition is a traditional role
for congressional action under the Commerce Clause.").
70 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1546b (2000).
71 In Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
the plaintiff argued that national protection of the endangered delhi sands flowerloving fly, an insect that metamorphoses from larva to pupa to fly only in certain
sands of southern California and which is used for no current commercial purpose,
could not be considered regulation of interstate commerce. The D.C. Court rejected
the contention, holding in part that "destructive interstate competition," which is
"likely to produce destructive results, such as elimination of endangered species'
habitat, environmental degradation, or exploitation of labor, can be regulated by
Congress." Id. at 1052 & n.10.
More recently, in a case involving a more charismatic megafauna, the red wolf,
which has been reintroduced by the national government as an endangered species
in North Carolina, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld application of
the ESA because "Congress may take cognizance of this [competitive] dynamic and
arrest the 'race to the bottom' in order to prevent interstate competition whose
overall effect would damage the quality of the national environment." Gibbs v.
Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501 (4th Cir. 2000).
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Nationalism also ensures that extremist state positions,
especially on matters such as individual rights, are less likely to
hold sway. The victories of nationalism over southern states in
the 1860s and 1960s freed African Americans first from slavery
and then from second-class citizenship under state laws that
72
were inconsistent with the moral views of the majority.
Finally, for those who question government more because of its
gaps in competence than for its power,7 3 national government
may be preferable because it can draw on the ideas and analyses
of interested persons throughout the entire nation, not just one
state. 74 While neither James Madison nor current federalist
rhetoric acknowledges them, efficiency and simplicity are often
fostered when citizens have only one level of government with
75
which to deal.

The Endangered Species Act is an especially rich topic in which to develop
Commerce Clause and federalist arguments. Perhaps the most intriguing argument
is the nationalist assertion that protection of each endangered species fosters
interstate commerce because of the interest in protecting biodiversity. Because each
species contains unique genetic or biological material, it is possible that each species
may be used for practical purposes at some time in the future by science or industry.
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496; Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052-53. There
have been a number of instances in which material from rare species has been put
to dramatic practical use, such as the Madagascar's rosy periwinkle's use in
medicine. See, e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 283-85 (1992).

Once a species goes extinct, its unique biology can never be recaptured. See DAVID
QUAMMEN, THE SONG OF THE DODO 605-25 (1996). Other commentators have
questioned the scientific validity of the astonishingly simple and elegant
biodiversity argument. See CHARLES C. MANN & MARTIN L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S

CHOICE 125-38 (1995).
72 See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS (1988) (giving a history
of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s).
73 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 213
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (exclaiming "Poor Joshua!" to the Court's holding
that the government's failure to take action in a perceived child abuse case was not
a violation of due process rights); William A. Owens & Stanley A. Weiss, An
Indefensible Military Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A29 (referring to the
scandal of $700 military toilet seats).
74 Although bureaucracies in the national government may prove frustrating,
they are often more efficient than those at the state or local level, as I think every
year when I compare my Internal Revenue Service form 1040-which I find to be a
model of clarity, considering the complexity of the tax code-with the more
mystifying state income tax forms.
715See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523-25 (1959)
(showing the difficulties in having varying state laws for things such as mud flaps
on trucks).
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II. THE CONTRIVANCE OF DUAL FEDERALISM

The Rehnquist Court's restrictions on the commerce
power have flummoxed many observers.
Professor Calvin
Massey has called Lopez and Morrison "aberrational and
anomalous," and he has predicted that Congress can avoid future
federalist difficulties with the Court simply by better
draftsmanship. 76 Some commentators have criticized the Court's
decisions for being as ad hoc and as unworkable as the we-knowit-when-we-see-it obscenity doctrine of the 1960s and 1970s.

77

Others assure us that nationalism need not worry about extreme
changes as a result of the new federalism-at least as long as
78
moderate Justices O'Connor and Kennedy remain on the Court.
In contrast to this sanguine attitude, I maintain that the
Rehnquist Court's opinions reveal a deep mistrust of common
features of modern national public law. Focusing on this
mistrust, I argue in this section of the Article that the Rehnquist

Court has revived, even if the Court has not admitted it, the
doctrine of dual federalism that was discredited in the New Deal
and that the foundation of the Rehnquist Court's new federalism
is not even as solid as its predecessor's. In Part III, I suggest
that much of the Court's impatience stems from faults in the
creation and implementation of certain national law regimeswhat I call the contrivances of motivation and construction.
Finally, in Part IV, I suggest that federalists are guilty of the
contrivance of libertarianism. In Part V, I propose new paths for
nationalism.
A.

SWANCC and Statutory Disregard

Although the Supreme Court in SWANCC 79 did not formally
reach the Commerce Clause issue, one should not assume that
this most recent federalist opinion is less significant than Lopez
or Morrison.80 Indeed, because it involved the interpretation of a
76 See MASSEY, supra note 8, at 183.

77 See Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The
Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV.
605, 631-32 (2001).
78 See Charles Tiefer, SWANCC: Constitutional Swan Song for Environmental
Laws or No More than a Swipe at Their Sweep?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11493, 11493

(2001).
79 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
80 Since SWANCC, the Court has not decided a major Commerce Clause case.
The most significant has been Pierce County, Wash. v. Guillen, 123 S. Ct. 720
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major federal public statutory regime, the Clean Water Act,8 1
SWANCC provides lessons that go beyond the holdings
concerning the comparatively obscure and isolated federal laws
82
struck down in Lopez and Morrison.
The facts of SWANCC were an exemplar of the ways in
which national law has insinuated itself into the regulation of
even relatively minor natural resources. Because the plans for a
new landfill in the suburbs of Chicago involved filling in some
small ponds that had been created by an abandoned mining
operation, the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
(SWANCC) sought permission from both state authorities and
the U.S. Army's Corps of Engineers.8 3 Congress has entrusted
the Army Corps8 4 with authority to grant or deny permits for the
"discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters"
through section 404 of the Clean Water Act.8 5 "Navigable
86
waters" is defined to include "the waters of the United States."
While there was no question that SWANCC's plan would involve
"discharge of ...fill," the state agency balked at the Corps'
conclusion that the small ponds in northern Illinois were
"navigable waters."8
The Corps defined "waters of the United States" through
regulation to include all waters that "could affect interstate or

(2003), in which the Court quickly rejected a commerce power challenge to a

national law that set forth a privilege for records of certain traffic accident reports.
The Court concluded rather easily that the law was a regulation of the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See id. at 731-32.
81 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). In its current codification, the Clean Water
Act is a mixture of various acts, the most significant of which was the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, also called the Clean Water Act, of 1972, Pub. L. 92240, 86 Stat. 47.
82 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 626-27 (2000) (striking
down the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (striking down a criminal offense under the GunFree School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2000)).
83 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 163 (2001).
84 The Army Corps has often been criticized by environmentalists for a lack of
adequate attention to the environmental consequences of its permitting program.
See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Working to Please Hill Commanders; In Miss. and
Elsewhere, Lawmakers Call Shots, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2000, at Al (criticizing
the Corps' permit programs).
85 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000). The authority of the Secretary of the Army is
carried out through the Chief of Engineers. Id. § 1344(d).
86 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
87 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 163-66.
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foreign commerce"88 and further clarified its definition through a
less formal administrative rule in 1986. This rule defined
"waters of the United States" as waters that are (a) habitat
for
birds protected by migratory bird treaties with foreign nations,8 9
(b) habitat for birds that cross state lines, (c) endangered species
habitat, and (d) water bodies used to irrigate crops sold in
interstate commerce. 90 Because the migratory bird "hook" of this
administrative definition covered the largest number of water
bodies, the administrative rule was referred to as the "Migratory
Bird Rule." 9 1
Upon finding dozens of bird species at the site, the Army
Corps concluded that the Cook County ponds were "waters of the
United States" under the Clean Water Act's section 404.92 The
Corps then denied SWANCC's permit application, concluding,
among other things, that the plan to fill the ponds was not the
"least environmentally damaging" alternative for the landfill. 93
The state agency challenged the Corps' determination in federal
court, arguing that isolated, single-state water bodies such as
the Illinois ponds it wanted to fill were not "navigable waters"
and, moreover, that the regulation of such water bodies is
beyond Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 94
The Supreme Court found for the state agency on the
statutory argument. 95 Writing for a five-justice majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Clean Water Act's
"navigable waters" does not, as a matter of statutory

88 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001). "Navigable waters" is defined at 33 C.F.R.
§ 329.4 (2001).
89 The treaties with the United Kingdom (for Canada) (Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat.
1702), with Mexico (Feb. 7, 1936), and with the former Soviet Union (Nov. 19, 1976)
are referred to in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-715 (2000), which
implements these treaties by making it illegal to "take" nearly any migratory bird
without a permit. Id. § 703.
90 Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2002).
91 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164. Although the Supreme Court noted that this
rule was not adopted pursuant to the notice and comment procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000), the Court did not indicate
what significance this fact held, other than to taint it. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at
164 n.1.
92 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164-65 (citing Army Corps' determinations).
93 See id. at 165 (citing Corps' determination).
94 See id. at 165-66.
95 See id. at 174. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had decided for
the Corps. 191 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 1999), aff'g 998 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. II. 1998).
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interpretation, reach isolated, single-state ponds. 96 Although the
Court did not delineate all the boundaries of the term "navigable
waters," it acknowledged that it covers water bodies that are
actually navigable by boats in interstate commerce and water
97
bodies that are adjacent to and affect truly navigable waters.
While the Court focused repeatedly on the import of the
adjective "navigable," it mentioned only briefly a source that one
might have expected to be the starting point for any question of
statutory interpretation: Congress's statutory definition of the
term in question. 98 Congress specifically defined "navigable
waters" in the Act to mean "the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas."99 This broad definition, albeit
somewhat vague, arguably covers all water bodies, regardless of
whether boats can navigate them. Statutory definitions usually
are dispositive in matters of interpretation, even if they do not
agree with a commonsense meaning of the term. 0 0 Congress is
the dictator of its own statutes; it could define navigable waters
to mean only those waters that are used in interstate commercial
navigation, only those waters in which the Exxon Valdez could
turn around, or all waters that look green at twilight. Congress
chose the definition "waters of the United States." Yet the
Supreme Court seemed to disallow to Congress the power to
define navigable waters as it wished: "We cannot agree [with the
Army Corps] that Congress' separate definitional use of the
phrase 'waters of the United States' constitutes a basis for
reading the term 'navigable waters' out of the statute."'' 1 The
Court cited no authority for its usurpation of Congress's
authority to define a statutory term.
Moreover, with its exclusive focus on section 404, the Court
failed to acknowledge that, in effect, it was defining "navigable
waters" for the entire Clean Water Act, of which the section 404
permit program is only a small part. A larger component of the

96
97

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72, 174.
Id. at 167, 171-72 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,

474 U.S. 121 (1985)).
98 See id. at 163 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000)).
99 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
l00 See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 729 F.2d 289, 292 n.8 (4th Cir. 1984)
("If the statute itself provides any definition of the meaning of the term involved,
that definition is controlling." (citing Conoco, Inc. v. FERC, 622 F.2d 796, 800 (5th
Cir. 1980))).
101 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
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Act is the program for regulating "effluents"-that is, regulating
industrial water pollution.10 2 Through what has been called the
03
most successful pollution control program in American history, 1
the Act prohibits polluting any navigable water without a
permit. 10 4 Permits are granted by either the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or through a federally
authorized state permit program, in most instances with a
requirement that the polluter use control technology to curtail
its pollution. 0 5 The permit program applies to any pollution
from a point source, such as a factory pipe, into navigable
waters. 10 6 Because SWANCC is now the leading Court opinion
as to the term "navigable waters," it holds tremendous
significance for the pollution control program. 10 7 Had the Court
dived even shallowly into the history of the Act, it would have
had to acknowledge that the primary purpose of the Clean Water
Act, which in its present form is mostly the product of the 1972
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 0 8 was pollution control, not
navigation. As Congress stated at the beginning of the 1972 Act:
"The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."109

The Court also diverged from traditional means of statutory
interpretation by refusing to defer to the administrative agency.
Citing the usually reliable Chevron doctrine," 0 the Army Corps
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-12, 1314, 1317.
See Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act and Related Programs, 37 ALI-ABA
295, 295, 314 (1996) ("America's water quality programs, led by the Clean Water
102

103

Act's National Pollution Discharge Elimination System.. . may be the most
"); Oliver A. Houck, The
successful pollution abatement effort in the country ..
Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10528,
10528 & n.215 (1991) (discussing the success of the Clean Water Act's pollution
control regulatory system).
104 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
105 Id. §§ 1342, 1311(b).
106 Id. § 1362(12), (16).
107 Pollution-control advocates and perhaps an environmentally minded EPA
will no doubt argue that "navigable waters" for subchapter III, 33 U.S.C. §§ 13111330, is not controlled by the interpretation in SWANCC.

108 Pub. L. 92-240, 86 Stat. 47 (codified at scattered sections of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000)).
109 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
110 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-44, 866 (1984) (remarking that when a statute is unclear, courts should defer to
a reasonable agency interpretation). Chevron was limited after SWANCC by United
States u. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 234 (2001).
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had argued that the Court should defer to its interpretation of
the ambiguous definition of "navigable waters.""' The Court
declined, both stating, "We find § 404(a) to be clear,"1 1 2 without
specifying precisely the content of the supposed clarity, and
strongly implying that the Army Corps' interpretation was not
entitled to the usual level of respect.11 3 As explained by the
Court, the Corps in 1974 had originally interpreted "navigable
1 1 4 It
waters" in effect to be waters that were truly navigable.
was not until 1977 that the Army Corps adopted its more
expansive interpretation, leading to the so-called Migratory Bird
Rule.11 5 Implying that the 1974 reading was superior, the Court
concluded that the federal agency "put forward no persuasive
evidence that the Corps mistook Congress' intent in 1974"116
even though agencies typically are entitled to Chevron deference
1 17
even when they change interpretations of statutory phrases.
Crucially, moreover, the Court failed to explain that the Army
Corps' 1974 interpretative regulation was not the first
administrative reading of "navigable waters." Congress granted
most of the responsibilities under the Clean Water Act to the
EPA, which in 1973 had defined the term to include in effect all
waters, including single-state water bodies that are utilized in
some fashion by interstate commerce activities." 8 In a lawsuit
brought in 1975 by environmentalists who were dissatisfied with
the narrower Army interpretation, a federal court ruled against
the Corps, holding that the key term "[was] not limited to the
traditional tests of navigability," and enjoining application of the
I

See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001).

Id.
The Court wrote, "Where an administrative interpretation of a statute
invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that
Congress intended that result." Id. This doctrine arises from "our prudential desire
not to needlessly reach constitutional issues," among other factors. Id. Because the
legislative history was unclear, the Court disregarded the Corps' interpretation that
"invoked" the outer limits of the commerce power. See id. at 172-73.
114 See id. at 168 (citing 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120(d)(1), 209.260(e)(1) (1974)).
112

113

115 See id. at 168.

Id.
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991) (noting deference still applies
even if an agency changes its interpretation). But see Seldovia Native Ass'n, Inc. v.
Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990) (remarking that when an agency changes
its interpretation of a statute without explanation it should be accorded less
deference).
8lsSee 38 Fed. Reg. 13529 (May 22, 1973) (defining the term "navigable
waters").
116
117
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Corps' 1974 regulation. 119 This ruling led the Corps into a long
rule making process that ended with its 1977 regulation. 120 The
SWANCC opinion's chiding of the Army Corps for changing its
interpretation failed to acknowledge that the Corps was in effect
ordered to abandon the 1974 regulation because the EPA-the
agency with primary responsibility for the Clean Water
Act-and a federal court had forced it to do so.
The Court's rejection in SWANCC of traditional tools for
statutory construction and deference left it with little by which
to decide the case. After it had concluded that the statutory
definition was not dispositive,' 21 decided that the legislative
history was ambiguous and useless, 122 ruled that Corps was not
entitled to deference, 123 and ignored the role of the EPA in
interpreting the Clean Water Act, the Court grasped at one
remaining interpretative tool.
B.

The Hand of "Tradition"
The Court in SWANCC retreated to a most rudimentary
argument-the tradition of state control over land and water
use. 24 Citing the Clean Water Act's declaratory statement that
one of the purposes of the Act was to " 'recognize, preserve, and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the
States ...to plan the development and use.., of land and water
resources,' "125 among other things, the Court concluded that it

119 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686
(D.D.C. 1975) (concluding that Congress meant the term "navigable waters" to be as
broad as possible under the Constitution and that the Army Corps' 1974
interpretation was thus unlawful).
120 For a thorough explication of the purposes and history of the 1972 Clean
Water Act and the Corps' rule making history, see Robert W. Haines, Wetlands'
Reluctant Champion: The Corps Takes a Fresh Look at "Navigable Waters", 6
ENVTL. L. 217, 218-24 (1975). See generally William Funk, The Court, The Clean
Water Act, and the Constitution:SWANCC and Beyond, 31 ENVTL. L. 10741 (2001).
121 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170 (discounting the definition of "waters of the
United States").
122 See id. at 170-72 (rejecting arguments from passage of the 1972 Act and an
"acquiescence" argument surrounding the 1977 amendments).
123 See id. at 172 (declining to apply Chevron deference).
124 See id. at 174 (finding that permitting respondent's claim would result in
impinging a state's right to exercise control over its land and water use).
125 Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000)) (alteration in original). Nearly all
environmental laws include such reassuring federalist boilerplate, even though the
Clean Water Act provides little for the states to do with regard to substantive
regulation of water pollution.
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must interpret the law so as not to interfere with "the States'
traditional and primary power over land and water use."' 26 Thus
27
isolated ponds cannot be navigable waters.
Did the Court really mean this? Is the tradition of state
government control over land and water use an adequate
support for the Court's narrow interpretation of the keystone
term of the Clean Water Act?
I suggest that reliance on
"tradition" is unsupportable as an interpretive principle.
First, while it is true that state governments traditionally
have exercised the lion's share of land and water regulationactually, local governments traditionally have controlled most of
land use law, 128 whereas states have had primary responsibility
over water allocation' 29-this share has been so eroded over the
years that the Court's implication of exclusivity is terribly
mistaken. Federal environmental law, of which the Clean Water
Act is a leading example, has implicated the federal government
in land and water law for decades.
The most prominent
requirement of the Clean Water Act of 1972 prohibits pollution
from a point source, such as an industrial pipe, without a
permit. 130 Although most states operate the permit system for
polluting sources within their boundaries, they do so through the
permission and supervision of the EPA.' 3 ' Moreover, national
law sets forth the substantive requirements for a permit. 32 For
the discharge of both toxic pollutants and less dangerous
conventional pollutants, a polluter must comply with EPAmandated technology appropriate for the particular industry to
which the applicant belongs, regardless of its location. 133 Thus
the Clean Water Act has been a major feature of water law for
thirty years.
Even with the SWANCC Court's narrow
interpretation of navigable waters, the Act would still impose
126
127
128

Id. at 174.

See id. at 168-74.
See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 29, at 3, 23-24, 36-40 (explaining the
development of state-authorized local land use controls).
129 See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 9-10 (3d
ed. 2000) (explaining that water resources are largely controlled by a variety of state
laws).
130 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000) (stating that the "discharge of any pollutant
by any person shall be unlawful").
111See id. § 1412(b) (indicating the procedure for states to run the national
pollution control system).
132 See id. §§ 1412, 1311(b)-(e).
133 See id.
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national control over pollution into any truly navigable river in
the nation, as well as any stream that flows into it or any
134
wetland that is adjacent to such truly navigable water bodies.
In sum, while Congress set forth in the Clean Water Act the
rhetoric of preserving state authority over land and water, 13 5 in
substance it gave extraordinary authority to the national
government. If Congress were unable to regulate land or water
use as a category, the Clean Water Act would be a nullity.
Other environmental laws similarly impose national
standards on land and water use. The Clear Air Act, while
giving states broader discretion than the Water Act to make sitespecific decisions concerning pollution control, still invokes the
firm hand of national regulation. The guiding principle of the
Clean Air Act is the attainment of "national ambient air quality
standards" created by the EPA for an EPA-generated list of
pollutants. 13 6 To give an example of the detail of national control
under the Clean Air Act, a business cannot-among other
restrictions--construct a polluting facility in a region where an
air quality standard has not been met unless the business has
arranged for an "offset" of pollution by some other polluting
137
source in the same region.
Likewise, the Superfund statute, which governs spills of
hazardous waste, 138 is essentially a national land use regulatory
law. Through the Superfund law, the EPA holds the authority to
order private landowners to engage in costly and timeconsuming cleanups of hazardous spills.139 Cleanup standards
134 See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138
(1985) (stating that "navigable waters" includes those waters that are navigable by
boats and those waters "abutting" a truly navigable waterway); see also SWANCC,
531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001).
135 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (recognizing states' rights to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution and to develop plans for effective use of land and water
resources).
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000) (stating requirements for setting the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards).
137 See id. § 7503(c)(1) (indicating offset requirement in non-attainment
regions). The offset may be obtained from a reduction in another region if the other
region has air quality that is as bad or worse than that of the new source. Id.
138 See generally Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (governing "hazardous substances releases,
liability, [and] compensation").
139 See id. § 9606(a) (stating that the Attorney General may "secure such relief
as may be necessary" when dealing with the "release of a hazardous substance from
a facility").
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must follow an EPA-developed system. 140 Similarly, the national
Endangered Species Act (ESA), which makes it unlawful to
"take" any species on a nationally created list, regulates land
and water use activities when they harm a protected species.' 4 '
Thus, draining water from a river for private use may trigger the
ESA if the decreased water flow harms a protected fish. 42 The
ESA followed the venerable Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 143 which
makes it illegal to kill, even unintentionally, any of a list of
protected migratory birds. 144 Accordingly, SWANCCs blanket
assertion that by tradition the states, not the national
government, control land and water law is not valid today, and it
has not been so for decades. When eroded, tradition becomes
merely history.
The Court's reliance on tradition was not isolated to
SWANCC. Indeed, it has been the guiding principle of the
Rehnquist Court's federalist jurisprudence. In Lopez, the Court
rebuffed the government's argument that a national gun
possession law was a permissible exercise of the commerce power
because of the potentially adverse effect that gun violence near
schools might have on the national economy. 45 Under such
logic, the Court reasoned, Congress could generate similar
arguments, "even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or
education where States historically have been sovereign."'146
Accepting the government's argument, the Court concluded,
110See id. § 9605 (creation of the National Contingency Plan to guide cleanups).
"I' See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000) (prohibiting the taking of any species
within the United States or territorial sea); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (upholding application of the
no-take restriction to habitat modification in appropriate circumstances). Although
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia dissented from the majority opinion in
Sweet Home, even they acknowledged that land-use activity undertaken for the
purpose of harming a protected species would constitute a taking. Id. at 719-20
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the issues of causation and other factors
in interpreting "take," see generally Paul Boudreaux, Understanding"Take" in the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733 (2002).
142 See, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 537 F. Supp.
106, 113 (D. Nev. 1982) (water needed for endangered species protection takes
precedence over water needed for municipal and industrial purposes).
143Act of July 3, 1918, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 703-715 (2000)).
14 See id. § 703 (stating that the killing of migratory birds is unlawful).
145See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-64 ("Under the theories that
the Government presents ...it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power ...").
146 Id. at 564.
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"would require us to conclude that the Constitution's
enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not
enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between
' 147
what is truly national and what is truly local."
In Morrison, the Court again grounded its federalist ruling
on tradition. The Violence Against Women Act, unlike the Lopez
gun law, contained explicit congressional findings and assertions
that the national law would foster interstate commerce. 148 But
such statements were of no avail, the Court wrote, because
similar arguments "may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied
equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state
Returning to history, the Court made the
regulation."'149
following conclusion:
The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is
not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods
involved in interstate commerce has always been the province
of the States. Indeed, we can think of no better example of the
police power, which the Founders denied the National
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of
violent crime and vindication of its victims. 150

Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted).
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-15 (2000) (citing
congressional findings on the effect that gender-motivated violence has on its
victims and their families and the deterrence that this violence has on interstate
travel and commerce).
149 Id. at 615.
150 Id. at 618 (citations omitted). In the first half of this quotation, the Court
added a significant requirement that it did not discuss elsewhere. Having noted
that, along with regulating channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
the regulation of activities "substantially affect[ing] interstate commerce" is a
means in which Congress may exercise its commerce power, id. at 608-09, the Court
then wrote that the "punishment of intrastate violence ... has always been the
province of the States," with the exception of "instrumentalities, channels, or goods
involved in interstate commerce," id. at 618. The Court did not explain why it
separated the "affecting interstate commerce" justification; its only citation was to
Cohens v. Virginia, in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "Congress has ... no
general right to punish murder committed within any of the States." 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 426 (1821). The Rehnquist Court needed to segregate channels and
instrumentalities, of course, because of the venerable precedent for Congress's
power to regulate them. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913)
(concluding that Congress may regulate interstate sexual transit); Champion v.
Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (holding that Congress may regulate interstate
commerce in the sale of lottery tickets); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
239-40 (1824) (finding that the Commerce Clause reaches interstate boat service).
What the Rehnquist Court did not do was explain why the "affecting interstate
commerce justification is a lesser justification than the others.
147
148

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:523

C. Dual Federalism,Revived
Thus, the Rehnquist Court's stance is revealed. The Court's
federalists assert that there are certain realms that are exclusive
to the states, onto which Congress may not trespass, regardless
of a national law's relation to interstate commerce. This view,
which has the benefit of seeming simplicity, is a reprise, I argue,
of the doctrine that the Supreme Court followed in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that modern
commentators have called dual federalism.
Professor David Engdahl, a federalist who nonetheless has
agreed with the expansion of national power in the New Deal
cases, explained that:
[D]ual federalism conceives of governmental power itself as
sliced into separate segments and parceled between nation and
states.... [B]y virtue of the distribution of governing power
under the Constitution, any given matter must be subject to
governance only by either the states or the United States, and
not by both: Each slice of the pie must be on one plate or the
other.... A natural corollary of this pie-slice [notion] is that
national and state governments each are forbidden to nibble at
the other's plate.151
A classic example of early dual federalism was Hammer v.
Dagenhart,152 the child labor case of 1918. Influenced by
nationalist Progressive thought in the first two decades of the
twentieth century, Congress had enacted the National Child
Labor Act of 1916.153 The Act made it unlawful to ship any good
in interstate commerce if it had been produced by the labor of
children under the age of sixteen. 154 The Supreme Court struck
down the law, reasoning that Congress plainly was concerned
not with commerce in the goods produced but with the perceived
evil of child labor. 15 5 The Act failed, therefore, because it
"exert[ed] a power as to a purely local matter to which the
federal authority does not extend."' 56 Hammer served to limit
5 7
national social legislation for twenty years.
15, DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL 11, 104

(2d ed. 1987).
152 247 U.S. 251 (1918) overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 115-16 (1941).
153 National Child Labor Act of 1916, Ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675 (1916).
154 See id. § 1.
155 See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271-72.
156 Id. at 276. One might summarize the lesson of Hammer as "you can't touch
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The history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence before
1940-and often after-was one of the most muddled, encrusted,
and occasionally contradictory bodies of precedent in
constitutional law. This was not surprising, considering the
inevitable clash between the federalist view of limited
congressional power and the progressive desires of socially
minded twentieth century legislators. 158 Beyond the problems of
distinguishing between commerce and non-commerce and
between interstate and non-interstate activity, the early
twentieth century Court also distinguished between what it
viewed as separate and traditional realms of national and local
authority. Thus, in 1935, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States,159 the Court overturned aspects of a national law
regulating working conditions at businesses, such as the butcher
Schechter's, which sold poultry that had been shipped
interstate. 160 The Court reasoned that because the trigger for
the National Industrial Recovery Act was the local sale of
poultry to consumers, nearly all of whom were New Yorkers, the
law had only an "indirect" effect on interstate commerce, and
thus the statute was unconstitutional. 16 1 Local transactions
"remain[ed] within the domain of state power."'16 2 Similarly, in
the last major reversal of New Deal legislation, Carter v. Carter
Coal Co.,' 63 the Court in 1936 refused to allow Congress to
regulate working conditions in the coal mining industry, in part
because the "relation of employer and employee... is purely
64
local in character" and thus not subject to national regulation. 1
These pre-1937 decisions, which relied on a perception of
traditional and exclusive dual realms of authority to delineate
the commerce power, are the true precursors to the Rehnquist
this."
157 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 213, 217-19

(1993) (explaining that Hammer, among other cases and factors, contributed to
limiting national social legislation).
158 Federalists might respond by arguing that the difficulties of pre-1937
Commerce Clause jurisprudence were nonetheless superior to the post-1937 law,
which consisted entirely of judicial contortions to make nearly any law fit within the
Commerce Clause.
159 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
16o See id. at 541-42.
161 See id. at 545-47.
162

Id. at 546.

163 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
164

Id. at 303.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:523

Court's reasoning, even though the Rehnquist Court fails to cite
them.
Dual federalism is seductive as a solution for limiting
national power. Its appeal rises from the observation that, as
Hammer put it, nationalist arguments seem to have no stopping
point, and thus "the power of the States over local matters may
be eliminated."'165 As the Court would repeat nearly a century
later in Morrison, "Congress might use the Commerce Clause to
completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between
national and local authority."'166 A dilemma in reinstituting dual
federalism, however, is that the doctrine of separate authorities
was thoroughly repudiated in the mid-twentieth century cases.
The familiar story of its decline has its roots in cases such as
Champion v. Ames,167 in which the Court in 1903 allowed
Congress to intrude on the traditionally local matter of lottery
regulation, but the fall was given its real push in 1937 with
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.' 68
The New Deal Congress had enacted compulsory
requirements for labor negotiations-a topic that the Court just
a year earlier in Carter Coal had dubbed "purely local in
character." 169 In Jones & Laughlin, however, the Court shifted
the constitutional analysis away from the tradition-oriented
approach towards a pragmatic approach of asking whether the
regulation had the effect of fostering or protecting interstate
commerce. 170 Because smooth labor relations promote interstate
commerce, the national law was a permissible exercise of the
commerce power. 17 1 Following Jones & Laughlin, the dual
165Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918), overruled in part by United

States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-16 (1941).
166United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
167 188 U.S. 321

(1903)

(upholding congressional regulation of interstate

commerce in lottery tickets).
168 301 U.S. 1 (1937). One theory of the Supreme Court's post-1936 liberality
with regard to congressional power arises from President Franklin Roosevelt's 1937
plan to expand the membership of the Court with additional like-minded jurists,
who presumably would overturn decisions such as Schechter. As the story goes, the
Court, or at least swing vote Justice Roberts, adopted a more approving view of
national legislation-the so-called "switch in time that saved nine." PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 39 (1982). The Court expansion plan was defeated in the

Senate. See generally William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of FranklinRoosevelt's
Court-PackingPlan, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347.
169 Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 303.
179 See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 32-42.
171 See id.
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federalist doctrine quickly crumbled.
In United States v.
172
Darby, the Court in 1941 upheld national regulation of
working conditions for a business that shipped goods in
interstate commerce, despite the business's argument that the
obvious purpose of the law was to regulate wages and hours-the
argument that had carried the day in Hammer.173 The Court
followed a permissive effects test and explicitly overruled
1 74

Hammer.

In addition to allowing Congress to legislate public morality
through the hook of interstate commercial crossings, as in
Darby, the Court also adopted a realist approach to laws
regulating activities that, though seemingly local in character,
have an indirect effect on nationwide commerce. The classic case
was Wickard v. Filburn,175 which concerned a congressional
quota system for national wheat production put in place to prop
up wheat prices. 176 A wheat farmer who was penalized for
growing more than his personal quota sued, arguing that
because his excess wheat was consumed domestically-for food,
livestock, and seed-it never entered into interstate commerce
and thus was free from national regulation. 177 The Court
rejected the argument that certain realms, such as local food
consumption, were off-limits to congressional authority. Because
unregulated home consumption could have a substantial
influence on the national market for wheat-with the
consumption of home-grown grain, the quantity of wheat
demanded in the national market would fall, thus leading to a
decline in the national market price-Congress must be
permitted to enact legislation that assists in achieving its
legitimate goal of regulation of wheat prices, regardless of the
local nature of home consumption. 178 In the wake of permissive
cases such as Darby and Wickard, the Supreme Court rejected
Commerce Clause challenges for the next half-century, firmly
rejecting separation of authority arguments and accepting all
assertions of links to interstate commerce 179 until Lopez.
172 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
173 See id. at 115-17.
174

See id. at 116-17.

175 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
176 See id. at 113-14 & n.2.
177

See id. at 118-19.

178 See id. at 121-31.
179

See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
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The challenge for federalist-minded jurists on the current
Court is to make sense of limitations on the commerce power in
light of the precedent since 1937. So far, the Rehnquist Court
has failed to do so. The Court could have attempted to dismantle
the perceived lenity of the post-1937 jurisprudence logically or to
revive Schechter's requirement of a "direct" relation to interstate
commerce. However, the Court has avoided the difficulties of
overruling precedent-as the Court did in Darby-and has
instead decided cases with its own ad hoc assessment of
tradition.
Tradition is, I maintain, an unstable support for delineating
the commerce power. Assumptions about history are often
overly broad and poorly justified, especially in the world of law.
The SWANCC opinion, as I have noted, assumed a historical
exclusiveness of state authority over land and water use, yet
failed to take account of the extensive national regulations of
land and water use for environmental protection purposes, many
of which are firmly grounded in the direct regulation of
interstate channels and instrumentalities, which even
federalists presumably would accept. 180 To say that the national
government cannot regulate land and water use means that the
national government cannot regulate the environment. Even
before environmental law reached maturity in the 1970s, one
could not generalize about land and water regulation. Congress
first regulated dumping into water bodies in 1899 with the
Rivers and Harbors Act, also called the Refuse Act, 181 a precursor
of the Clean Water Act's section 404.182 While federalists might
hasten to add that the purpose of the Rivers and Harbors Act
264, 281-83 (1981) (finding that national law may regulate long-term land use
associated with strip mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154, 156-57
(1971) (holding that Congress may criminalize loan-sharking involving the threat of
violence); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302-305 (1964) (determining that

Congress may use the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to regulate a restaurant that uses
ingredients shipped across state lines).

180 See, for example, the Clean Air Act's regulation of pollutants that deplete

stratospheric ozone, which is an oxygen molecule consisting of three oxygen atoms
and which assists in protecting humans from harmful ultraviolet radiation, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q (2000) and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act's outlawing of the
taking of birds that migrate internationally, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2000). See generally
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920) (upholding the MBTA on treaty-

making constitutional grounds).
18J Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425 § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (currently
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000)).
182 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
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was to protect interstate navigation from encumbrances, not to
protect the environment per se,18 3 the point is that the law
imposed national regulation on land and water use for more than
100 years before SWANCC. The first national Water Pollution
Control Act was enacted in 1948.184 The Rehnquist Court has
18 5
relied on English traditions to help delineate property rights,
yet English history reveals a tradition of national regulation of
18 6
land use stretching back to the Elizabethan era.
Assumptions about tradition in other areas of law can be
just as shaky. Recall that a key holding of Carter Coal and other
cases disapproving of national regulation of employment
18 7
conditions was that this field was "purely local in character."
This was the view of tradition-minded jurists in 1936. A year
later, however, the Court opened up the gates to congressional
88 and the
regulation of employment in Jones & Laughlin,1
nation's employers have seen national regulation expand from
the area of collective bargaining, the issue in Jones & Laughlin,
to national regulation of occupational health and safety18 9 and
national control of discrimination in hiring and firing. 190 While
it may have seemed historically accurate to view employment as
a purely local matter in 1937, it plainly is not accurate to do so
anymore.
With the expansion of national law into so many spheres of
human activity, it has become more difficult to locate realms
that remain free of congressional intrusion. The Rehnquist
Court in Lopez' 9 1 and MorrisonI92 cited family law and education
183 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 324

(1992).
184 Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).

185 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992)
(relying in large part on the traditional Anglo-American common law of "nuisance"
to establish the boundaries of the Fifth Amendment's right against uncompensated
takings of private property).
18, See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 29, at 2-3.
187 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936).
188 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
189See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000)).
190See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-56 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 330-37 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1211112117 (2000)).
191 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-66 (1995) (raising the specter
that Congress could reach family law or education law).
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law-spheres that have the benefit of seeming "domestic" and
thus perhaps the most inappropriate for meddling from
Washington. Yet there is nothing inherent in family law or
education law that makes them appropriate for state control
alone. Through the establishment of nationally created rights to
abort pregnancies 193 and use contraceptives,194 national
law-albeit from the courts, not Congress-restricts state
If it seems
regulation of personal reproductive decisions.
difficult to imagine a national law regulating marriage,
childbirth, or parenting, 195 I suggest that this is because we
perceive such spheres to be outside the limits of governmental
authority, 196 rather than because such spheres are inherently
appropriate for exclusive state regulation. In education, as well,
the assumed exclusivity of state law is in reality a mixed issue.
It is true that state and local governments hold the primary
responsibility for educating young people. 9 7 Nonetheless, the
national government has insinuated national ideas into the
educational world through financial support of school
construction and instructional assistance, albeit mostly
98
voluntary, by the Department of Education.'
Indeed, as the Rehnquist Court has rightly concluded, it
would require no leap of logic to move from justifying the
national laws at issue in Lopez and Morrison to justifying
national regulation of education. As reasoned in Lopez, the
national government's argument relating gun-related violence to
192 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) (raising the
specter that Congress could reach family law).

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (creating right to abortion).
194 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding right to use
contraceptives).
95 It was difficult to imagine, that is, before suggested by the Senate
Republican leader in 2003, a constitutional amendment prohibiting states from
allowing gay marriages. See Alan Cooperman, Sodomy Ruling Fuels Battle Over
Gay Marriage,WASH. POST, July 31, 2003, at Al.
196See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (deciding that states may not
prohibit interracial marriages, in large part because of a right to marry). The
exceptions are for relatively minor state administrative rules, such as a minimum
age for marriage and blood-test requirements.
197 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("Judicial
interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises
problems requiring care and restraint .... By and large, public education in our
Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.").
,98 For a link to summaries of the various national programs that support local
education, see the U.S. Department of Education's web site, http://www.ed.gov/
offices/OESE/program._html.
193

2003]

THE CONTRIVANCES OF PUBLIC LAW

the interstate economy "would be equally applicable, if not more
so, to subjects such as family law and direct regulation of
education." 199 As reiterated in Morrison, the argument that
Congress may foster interstate commerce by protecting women
from violence could apply equally well to questions of parenting
because "the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and
childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly
significant."200 To envisage an example less sensationalistic than
a regulation of how many children a woman may
bear-something that states could not do either, of
course 20 1 -imagine a future pressing foreign policy and national
security need for American citizens who understand the Arabic
language. Congress might respond with legislation requiring
that all local school systems of a certain size offer courses in
Arabic in high school. While such a law would intrude on the
supposed tradition of exclusive state and local control of
education, 20 2 it seems to me that such a law would be no more

abhorrent on Commerce Clause grounds than the regulation of
20 3
home-grown wheat or small-town restaurants.
The appropriate response to the Rehnquist Court's slippery
slope argument is not to deny it but to question the dividing line
that the Court has drawn. Tradition does not justify a stopping
point. Indeed, it would be more stable intellectually, I suggest,
to return to first principles by construing "commerce ...among
the several states" 20 4 to encompass only direct regulation of

interstate commerce, as in Schechter, even if such a doctrine
would be more incendiary as a matter of politics. In any event,
the Rehnquist Court's reliance on tradition to delineate the

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000).
201 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (establishing a
right to privacy that includes reproduction).
202 Professor Weinberg has suggested that, while Congress has the presumptive
power to enact the national school curricula, see Louise Weinberg, Fear and
Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1295, 1333 (1997), there is a real fear that
national control could lead to mass education, with totalitarian vulnerabilities, see
id. at 1335.
203 See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (regulating
discrimination in restaurants that serve food that has moved in interstate
commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (regulating a farmer's
production of wheat purely for his own consumption).
204 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
199
200
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commerce power is a contrivance that should and will be
regretted.
III. THE CONTRIVANCES OF MOTIVATION AND CONSTRUCTION
Behind the Rehnquist Court's new federalism lies a deep
skepticism of the course of certain national public laws. This
skepticism stems, I believe, from perceived contrivances in the
drafting and administration of the statutory regimes. These
contrivances, which I discuss in this part, may help push the
Court in a federalist direction for years to come.
A.

The Contrivanceof Motivation

The first federalist criticism of national law is the
contrivance of motivation. According to this criticism, many
national laws that are purported to be regulations of interstate
commerce are more properly characterized as laws motivated by
morality, fairness, or social justice. The Child Labor Act of
1916205 and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994206 are
prime examples. To characterize such social legislation as an
exercise of Congress's power to regulate "commerce . . . among
the several states" strikes many as contrived and false. The
Rehnquist Court, however, unlike the Court before 1937, has not
been willing to reject laws explicitly on the ground of improper
motivation, perhaps because of the thorns involved in trying to
construe the purpose and motivation for congressional
legislation. 20 7 Nonetheless, a close reading of the Rehnquist
205 Ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675 (1917).
206 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
207 It is not unusual for the Supreme Court to suppress important elements of

its thinking, even in the most significant cases, to avoid difficulties of politics and
application. In perhaps the most famous opinion of the 20th century, Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court avoided the most
straightforward objection to the separate-but-equal myth of racial segregation-the
fact that opportunities and services available to African Americans were rarely, if
ever, truly equal in practice-in favor of reliance on a sociological conclusion that
educational segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority" among African American
students. Id. at 494. By relying on studies such as the doll-choosing tests of
sociologist Kenneth Clark, id., the Court was able to outlaw, at least in theory,
racial segregation throughout the nation as a matter of law, as opposed to having to
resort to findings of fact, which would have been easier for supporters of segregation
to battle in the lower courts and through piecemeal improvements in opportunities
for African Americans. Today, of course, the notion that studying in an all-black
environment "generates a feeling of inferiority" is an argument to which few African
American leaders would subscribe. See, e.g., Michael Fletcher, NAACP Facing New
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Court's decisions reveals dissatisfaction with the contrivance of
motivation, which in turn serves as a major impetus to its
revived federalism.
The first of the three recent major federalist decisions,
Lopez, was the most difficult for the government to justify
because Congress failed to explain in its legislation how
criminalizing gun possession near schools might affect interstate
commerce. 20 8 Rejecting government counsel's argument that gun
possession might depress national productivity, the Court stated
that "[t]o uphold the government's contentions here, we would
have to pile inference upon inference."2 0 9 To its credit, the Court
then noted that cases after 1937 had in effect been so deferential
to the government that they allowed the piling of inference upon
inference to reach a finding of constitutionality. 2 10 But no more
contrivances, the Court seemed to say-we now need explicit and
well-supported congressional evidence that the national laws are
indeed designed to substantially affect interstate commerce.
Morrison made out a stronger case for congressional
authority because Congress, perhaps mindful of growing
federalist skepticism, incorporated in the Violence Against
Women Act explicit findings that the law would foster interstate
commerce by, among other things, encouraging potential female
victims of violence to travel from state to state. 211 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court refused to swallow the evidence. First, it
characterized the findings as "a method of reasoning that we
have already rejected [in Lopez] as unworkable if we are to
maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers."2 12 The
"method" that the Court referred to, however, was not a method
at all, but rather the Court's perceived dilemma that if it allowed
the law in Morrison to stand, there could be no stopping
Congress from "obliterat[ing] the Constitution's distinction
between national and local authority." 213 In effect, the complaint
was that the Court could see no limit for national law if it let the
violence against women law pass muster.
Challenges Over Integration,WASH. POST, July 14, 1997, at Al.
208 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995).
209 Id. at 567.
210 See id.
211 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (quoting H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 103-711, at 385).
212 Id.
213 Id.
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So where is the dividing line between permissible
congressional invocations of an effect on interstate commerce
and those that the Court will reject? As I have argued above, the
Court's reliance on "tradition" is a dead end. In Lopez and
Morrison, another, somewhat hidden, factor was at work-a
factor expressed through the Court's observation of what it
214
called the "attenuated"link of the law to interstate commerce.
This criticism of attenuation can be explained by either of
two related concepts. First, the Court could have been seeking to
inject a requirement of proximate causation-that notorious
bugbear of the common law of torts. 2 15 Using the law of
causation would not be unprecedented in commerce power
jurisprudence. In 1935, Schechter set forth a distinction based
on whether the law was a permissible "direct" regulation of
216
interstate commerce or an impermissible "indirect" regulation.
If so, however, the Rehnquist Court has created for itself a
distinction that is even more vague than Schechter's soonabandoned direct/indirect test. Would the proximate causation
issue be decided under the tight standard of In re Polemis, 217 the
Restatement of Torts's much looser "substantial factor" test,218 or
with some other application? And considering that interstate
commerce is not a discrete event, such as an accidental tort, but
a process of economic activity across the nation, how could a
court ever reasonably determine whether a law is too
"attenuated" to be a proximate cause of changes in commerce?
Such questions would have to be resolved before proximate
causation could serve as a working limitation on the commerce
power.
A more sensible interpretation, I suggest, is that the Court
did not mean to refer to proximate causation at all. Rather, it
214 See id. at 612 (referring to the government's argument in Lopez as
"attenuated") (emphasis added); see also id. at 615 (describing the government's
justification in Morrison as suffering from the same defects).
215 See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 273 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984) (referring to the confusion surrounding the doctrine).
216 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546
(1935) ("[W]here the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is
merely indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state power.").
217 See In re Polemis, 3 K.B. 560, 572 (1921) (holding that the actor is liable for
all direct consequences of his negligent acts).
218 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) ("The actor's negligent
conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if ... his conduct is a substantial factor
in bringing about the harm.").
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meant to address the question of motivation. If legislation is
motivated (exclusively? primarily?) by a desire to foster
interstate commerce, it probably passes constitutional muster. If
aimed primarily at some other goal, it may not. Thus, in
Morrison, it is likely that the Court viewed the Violence Against
Women Act as being motivated primarily by considerations of
social justice-a desire to provide in federal court a civil law
remedy for women who have suffered gender-motivated violence.
Indeed, the legislative history shows that the chief concern of
Congress was that some state and local law enforcement officials
have not paid adequate attention to prosecuting gendermotivated violence. 219 The same rationale, of course, provided
the impetus for enacting national civil rights remedies to combat
racial discrimination. 220
Likewise, making gender-motivated
crimes a federal violation provided a "symbol" of a national
commitment to overcoming generations of neglect of domestic
221
and other forms of violence against women.
Judicial scrutiny of the true motivations of Congress would
be nothing new in commerce power jurisprudence. In the era
before 1937, the Supreme Court often struck down legislation
that appeared to be motivated primarily by social welfare
concerns, not by a desire to foster interstate commerce. As early
as Champion v. Ames, 222 in which the Court upheld the national
criminalization of interstate traffic in lottery tickets, 223 Chief
Justice Fuller joined three other dissenters in arguing that the
Court should puncture Congress's veneer of interstate commerce
regulation and expose its true motivation. 224 He wrote "[t]hat
219 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 624-25 (discussing the purpose of the law as, in
part, making up for lax prosecution).
220 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (declaring anyone who deprives another
citizen of his or her constitutional rights liable in a civil action); Emery G. Lee III,
Note, Federal Rights, Federal Forum: Section 1983 Challenges to State Convictions
in Federal Court, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 353, 389-91 (2000) (discussing the
original purpose of section 1983 as a compensation for the states' reluctance to
battle the Ku Klux Klan).
221 See Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L.
REV. 601, 618 (2001) (referring to the Violence Against Women Act as "largely
symbolic"). One can make a similar analysis for Lopez. There, the federalization of
guns-near-schools laws serves as a symbol of a stepped-up national commitment to
stamping out gun violence in schools.
222 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
223 See id. at 354 (holding that lottery tickets can be subject to trafficking and
are therefore part of interstate commerce).
224 See id. at 364-75.
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the purpose of Congress in this enactment was the suppression
of lotteries cannot reasonably be denied."225 Such a purpose is
unconstitutional, he concluded, because the "promotion of the
public health, good order and prosperity is a power originally
and always belonging to the States, not surrendered by them to
the General Government nor directly restrained by the
Constitution."226 By the 1930s, the Court was bolder in its
rejection of the contrivance of using the commerce power as a
means of legislating social welfare. In the first major setback for
New Deal legislation, Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railroad,227 the Supreme Court struck down a law regulating
the railroad business, usually a safe arena for congressional
regulation, because the statute imposed employment retirement
and pension requirements on the railroads. 228 Holding that such
employment matters were too "remote" from interstate
commerce concerns, the Court reasoned that the statute was
"really and essentially related solely to the social welfare of the
229
worker" and was thus beyond the power of Congress.
Similarly, the Court in Schechter pierced the argument that
Congress was regulating interstate commerce in the poultry
business and determined that "'the attempt ... to fix the hours
and wages of employees of defendants in their intrastate
230
business was not a valid exercise of federal power."
The era of motivation piercing soon dissipated, of course,
and by United States v. Darby231 the Court permitted wage and
working-hour controls on businesses that shipped goods across
state lines. 232 As long as the law was triggered only by interstate
transactions then Congress was within its powers. "The motive
and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters
for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the
Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are

225

226
227

228

Id. at 364.
Id. at 364-65.
295 U.S. 330 (1935).
See id. at 374 (holding that a railroad pension plan is not connected to the

regulation of interstate commerce).
229

Id. at 368.

2,30 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935).
231 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
232 See id. at 125-26 (holding that employers whose goods are shipped
interstate are subject to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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given no control," the Court held in dismissing the business's
233
arguments of improper congressional purpose.
The issue of congressional motivation held little weight in
commerce power jurisprudence for the next half-century, as the
Court repeatedly upheld laws that appeared to be driven by
perceptions of social welfare because of their "effect," however
slight or incidental, upon interstate commerce.
The most
striking examples were the Civil Rights Act cases of 1964,
Katzenbach v. McClung234 and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States.235 Although the preamble to the original bill for
the Civil Rights Act 236 stated that its purpose was "to promote
the general welfare by eliminating discrimination based on race,
color, or national origin,"237 the Court in Katzenbach found the
issue of congressional motivation irrelevant.
Instead, the
constitutional issue whether Ollie's Barbecue of Birmingham,
Alabama, could be regulated by Congress depended only on
"whether the particular restaurant either serves or offers to
serve interstate travelers or serves food a substantial portion of
which has moved in interstate commerce." 238 The Court applied

233 Id. at 115. The Darby opinion hedged its bets on the issue of motivation,
however, by characterizing Congress's purpose not simply as the desire to regulate
employment conditions through the hook of interstate commerce but through the
following fine example of saying something impressive without saying much of
anything:
The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly to make
effective the Congressional conception of public policy that interstate
commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the
distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which
competition is injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to
which the commerce flows.
Id.
234 379 U.S. 294, 298-305 (1964) (holding that racial discrimination in
restaurants may be regulated because it encourages interstate travel to restaurants
and because the restaurant served food that crossed state lines).
235 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (concluding that Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000), which outlawed racial
discrimination in accommodations, was constitutional in large part because of the
effect of fostering interstate travel among African Americans).
236 Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a2000h-6).
237 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 245 (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 124,
at 14 (1963)). An assertion that a law is justified because it serves the "general
welfare" would of course imperil the law under a restrictive view of the commerce
power.
238 379 U.S. at 304.
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the ultra-deferential "rational basis" test and upheld the
national law on this ground. 239
By contrast, the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence, with its
rejection of "attenuated" assertions of an effect on interstate
commerce, 240 has opened the door for a revolution in
constitutional law. The Court's revived skepticism of the
motivations of Congress is potentially a far more significant
development than other details of commerce power doctrine,
such as the issue
of when the effects of economic activity may be
"aggregated"241-a
detail that has attracted far more
commentary than the motivation issue. 242 The revival of
skepticism also raises problems. The challenge of ascertaining
legislative motivation, which has been developed largely in the
context of racially-motivated laws, is notoriously complicated. 243
Suffice to say here that the Rehnquist Court has not yet
explained how it might grapple with the issue of mixed
motivations. Consider the Violence Against Women Act at issue
in Morrison. While one may assume that the primary
motivation of members of Congress was social justice, which may
be outside the commerce power, it is also possible that the
supposed positive economic effect of the law was a secondary
motivation. Or consider an environmental law such as the Clean
Water Act. One motivation for the government's regulation of
single-state water bodies may have been a belief in "deep
ecology," the notion that environmental integrity is good for its
own sake. 244 Another motivation may have been to protect the
interstate commerce of migratory bird hunting. So far, the
Rehnquist Court has failed to address whether such mixed-

2.39See id. (holding that Congress has a "rational basis" for linking racial
discrimination in a restaurant with interstate commerce).
240 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000) (referring to the
attenuated link between gun possession and interstate commerce).
241 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60, 567 (1995) (differentiating
instances where the Court found that Congress did not overreach its Commerce
Clause authority and possessing a gun in a school zone).
242 See, e.g., Dral & Phillips, supra note 77, at 606-08, 618-20.
243 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84
CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1214-15 (1996) (discussing the complexities of discerning racial
motivation in legislative decisions).
244 See, e.g., Keith Hirokawa, Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical
Critique in Environmental Law, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 239 (2002) (discussing
deep ecology).
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motivation laws might or might not be permissible under the
commerce power.

245

The Rehnquist Court has avoided many difficult issues by
falling back, of course, on "tradition." In SWANCC, Morrison,
and Lopez, the Court each time evaded the sticky issue of
motivation by moving on to the conclusion that Congress had
trespassed into a sphere-land and water use or violent crimeonto which it cannot tread, presumably even if the exclusive
motivation was to foster interstate commerce. 246 Because this
dual federalist idea is unsustainable, I maintain, the Court must
address the complex and subtle questions of motivation if it
hopes to make its commerce power jurisprudence whole.
Whether it can do so successfully remains to be seen.
To flesh out the implications of a revived federalism that
draws a line between permissible and contrived motivations,
return to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 247 which among other
in
discrimination
gender
and
outlawed race
things
accommodations such as motels and restaurants, 248 in
federally-assisted
in
schools, 249
government-operated
25 0 and in employment. 25 ' Constitutional challenges to
programs,
this famous law brought on behalf of a Georgia motel and an
Alabama barbecue restaurant led to the Supreme Court's most
252
deferential opinions in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
But segregationists and diehard federalists were not the only
ones bothered by the Supreme Court's holding that the Civil
Rights Act was a justified exercise of the commerce power.
See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (noting the
standards for assessing mixed motivation in statutory discrimination cases).
Returning to first principles, advocates of nationalism might argue that because
Congress holds the power to regulate any and all interstate commerce, the fact that
laws serve other purposes should not invalidate them-to do so would limit
Congress's plain authority.
246 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 614-19 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-68.
247 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
248 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
249 Id. § 2000b.
250 Id. § 2000d.
251 Id. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2.
252 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 278 (1964)
(upholding application of nondiscrimination requirements to a motel); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (upholding application of the
245

nondiscrimination requirements to a restaurant).
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Professor Gerald Gunther suggested that the Court should have
sought out alternative constitutional foundations. 253
More
recently, in developing a response to the Rehnquist Court's new
federalism, Professor Donald Regan called Katzenbach's
reasoning a "disaster as Commerce Clause precedent" and
suggested that the Court should have relied instead on the
Reconstruction
Amendments,
especially
the
Fourteenth
Amendment's authorization to Congress to pass legislation to
25 4
enforce the equal protection guarantee.
Whatever their flaws at the time, the 1964 Commerce
Clause opinions now hold nearly forty years of precedential
value. But this is only half as long as the period in which the
Supreme Court adhered to the precedent of 1883's Civil Rights
Cases that Congress could not regulate discrimination at
privately-owned accommodations. 25 5 Although it may seem
unthinkable that the Court could revisit the constitutionality of
the discrimination statutes, it is instructive to consider how an
emboldened federalist Court might scrutinize such laws today.
It is not hard to figure out how the pre-1937 Court would
have dealt with national laws that sought to regulate whom
restaurants could serve, hotels could accept, or employers could
hire. As reasoned in Hammer, the courts must penetrate a
contrived veneer of legislation and ascertain its true motivation.
The Child Labor Act of 1916 "aim[ed] to standardize the ages at
which children may be employed." 256 Social welfare, or even the
argument that the law prevented "unfair competition," were not
valid goals of national legislation under the Constitution, the
Court concluded. 25 7 Likewise, in rejecting the national collective
bargaining requirements at issue in Carter Coal, the Court
reaffirmed its statement that "beneficent aims, however great or
well directed, can never serve in lieu of constitutional
power.... Thus, it may be said that to a constitutional end
many ways are open; but to an end not within the terms of the
Constitution, all ways are closed."258 The anti-discrimination
legislation of the 1960s, even couched in terms of restricting only
2,':

See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN

&

GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

145-48 (14th ed. 2001).
254 See Regan, supra note 51, at 595-96.
255

256

109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918).

257 Id. at 272.

258 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936).

2003]

THE CONTRIVANCES OF PUBLIC LAW

businesses that are somehow linked to interstate commerce,
would have been struck down as pursuing an aim-the social
justice of equality and non-discrimination-that was beyond the
authority of Congress under the Constitution.
Today's commerce power doctrine has been refined to
encompass three categories of permissible congressional
regulation: 259 (1) the regulation of channels of interstate
commerce, such as interstate roads and rivers; 260 (2) the
regulation of instrumentalities in interstate commerce, such as
lottery tickets that cross state lines; 261 and (3) the regulation of
262
activities that "substantially affect interstate commerce."
Nearly all of the controversies that reach the Supreme Court
implicate the third category, in which the regulated activity is
not itself interstate commerce but may nonetheless be regulated
because it substantially affects interstate commerce. 263 The most
striking example remains Wickard v. Filburn,264 in which the
Court upheld the regulation of homegrown wheat because of its
265
potential effect on the national wheat market.
To assess how the discrimination laws might fare under the
Rehnquist Court's logic and rhetoric, consider the most
frequently litigated title266 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-Title
VII, which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate in
hiring, firing, or other employment practices "because of [an]
267
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Although lower courts have held, in accordance with the 1964
259 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (summarizing
the three means by which Congress may lawfully exercise its commerce power).
26o E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1824) (stating that only the
national government can regulate channels of interstate commerce).
261 E.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); see also Houston, E. & W. Tex.
Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914) (allowing the national regulation
of a railroad business, even for those lines that did not cross state borders).
262 E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1937)
(stating that Congress may regulate collective bargaining in industries that promote
interstate commerce).
263 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (noting that the government argued only
that the violence-against-women law was justifiable under the "affects interstate
commerce" prong); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-64 (1995) (arguing the
same for the guns law).
264 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
265 See id. at 124-25.
266 In 2001, of the approximately 41,000 civil rights cases filed in the U.S.
Courts, slightly more than half were employment cases. See Federal Judicial
Caseload Statistics, March 31, 2002, Table C-2, available at www.uscourts.gov.
2G7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
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opinions, that Title VII is a valid exercise of the commerce
power, 268 the Supreme Court, while assuming constitutionality,
has never directly ruled on the question. 269
Under the Rehnquist Court's doctrine, the constitutional
scrutiny of Title VII might go something like this. First, the fact
that nearly every employer is engaged in "economic activity"
permits a particular employer's effect on interstate commerce to
be aggregated with those of other employers in the same
business. 270
Although
being "economic" differentiates
employment from gun-carrying or violence against women, this
factor is only the first step in the "affecting interstate commerce"
analysis. 27 1 The second step is determining whether Congress
provided any jurisdictional element to limit the reach of the law.
Congress ostensibly limited Title VII to those employers in an
"industry" that "affects interstate commerce." 272
But this
restriction is nothing more than a truism-Congress merely
restated the law of the greatest potential reach of the commerce
power.273

Indeed, the practical reach of Title VII bears a resemblance
to the reach of the Clean Water Act that the Rehnquist Court
interpreted so severely in SWANCC.
Title VII defines
"commerce" to mean "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation,

268 E.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1255 &
n.102 (3d Cir. 1978).
269 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 499 (1980) (referring to Heart of

Atlanta and Katzenbach in reference to Title VII).
270 See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
271 Indeed, in Lopez the fact that the defendant was planning to sell the gun he
was prosecuted for possessing was not mentioned by the Supreme Court and
obviously did not affect the Court's skepticism. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d
1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that Lopez was planning to sell the gun),
aff'd, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
272 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g), (h) (2000).
273 See, e.g., Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647 (1944) (stating
that when Congress "wants to bring aspects of commerce within the full sweep of its
constitutional authority, it manifests its purpose by regulating not only 'commerce'
but also matters which 'affect,' 'interrupt' or 'promote' interstate commerce"). Unlike
the public accommodations provision in Title II, Title VII does not explicitly make
the use of goods in interstate commerce a ground for regulating the business.
Compare Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (defining "industry affecting commerce" in
general terms) with Title II, id. § 2000a(c) (defining a restaurant as "affect[ing]
commerce" if "a substantial portion of the food which it serves ... has moved in
commerce").
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transmission, or communication among the several States."274 In
practice, however, it has proven nearly impossible for an
employer to avoid Title VII coverage because the federal courts
have allowed the employers' use of any goods from interstate
commerce to serve as a sufficient hook. 275 As stated by one
appellate opinion, "[i]t is difficult to imagine any activity,
business or industry employing 15 or more employees that would
not in some degree affect commerce among the states."276 Just as
the Court in SWANCC reasoned that the government's
expansive interpretation of "navigable waters" was an
unacceptable contrivance, 277 it would not be surprising for the
Rehnquist Court to conclude that the expansive application of
Title VII is a similarly unacceptable contrivance. Following the
logic of SWANCC that the Clean Water Act cannot reach every
local pond, the Court could similarly restrict the Title VII
practice of covering every small business under the statute
simply because it uses an out-of-state chair or pencil. After all,
statutes must be read even to avoid the constitutional problems
raised by regulating local activities, the Rehnquist Court
278
concluded in SWANCC.
The next step in the Rehnquist Court's commerce power
analysis concerns whether the legislature made express findings
as to the effect of the regulated activity on interstate
commerce. 27 9 As cited in the 1964 opinions, Congress found that
racial discrimination hampered interstate travel and job
opportunities for African Americans. 28 0 There should be no
doubt that employment discrimination serves as a barrier to full
participation in the national economy.
But congressional
findings of a link between violence against women and interstate
274
275

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g).
See, e.g., EEOC v.

Ratliff, 906 F.2d

1314,

1316-17

(9th Cir.

1990)

(concluding that use of business equipment made in a different state would be
sufficient to justify regulation under the Commerce Clause).
271;Id. (quoting A. LARSON & L.K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 5.31, at 2-40 (1987)).
277 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001).
278 See id. at 172-73 (noting the avoidance-of-constitutional-issues
doctrine
stated in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
27.) See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000).
2801 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53
(1964) (citing congressional findings
Americans in finding accommodations).

concerning

the

difficulties

for African
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commerce failed to save the statute in Morrison.281 While the
connection between employment discrimination and commerce
might seem closer than the association between violence and
commerce, the Civil Rights Act's justifications might be more
vulnerable on a number of grounds. First, they are nearly forty
years old. Second, while they relate almost exclusively to
discrimination against African Americans, Title VII was
amended during drafting to outlaw discrimination based on sex,
82
religion, and national origin as well. 2

The Rehnquist Court has in effect relied on two paths of
thought in declining to defer to congressional findings of a
putative link between regulation and interstate commerce-first,
a slippery slope
concern, 2 3 and second, a finding of unlawful
"attenuation."284 As for the slippery slope, the Court in Morrison
rejected the supposed links between the law and interstate
commerce because, if it accepted Congress's reasoning, Congress
would be able to regulate anything. 2 5 To arrest the slip, the
Court turned to tradition. 28 6 How might Title VII fare under
such scrutiny? In the days of Carter Coal, the Court viewed
employment matters as firmly within the traditionally and
exclusively "local" sphere. 28 7 Such a generalization regarding
employment matters would be harder to swallow today,
considering the decades of national regulation of working
hours, 28 employment safety, 289 and, since 1964, race and sex
discrimination. 290
By contrast, the "attenuation" ground might form a more
coherent way of limiting congressional power over employment
matters. Although SWANCC seemed to relate the problem of
281 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15.

282 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (b) (2000).
283 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-17.
284

See id. at 612.

285Id. at 615-16.
286 See id. at 615-16.
287 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) (explaining that the
"relation of employer and employee ... is purely local in character").
288 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000) (imposing wage
and hour standards).
289 See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
290 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 241,
243-44 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000)). Of course, the Court in
SWANCC ignored similar, if less extensive, national regulation of land and water
use. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 159, 174 (2001).
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attenuation to the traditional spheres of authority, 29 ' there is
nothing inherently attenuated about national regulation of
traditionally local matters. Regulation of state water use, for
example, has potentially important interstate concerns, as a
history of federal intervention in state-to-state water disputes
shows. 292 Rather, I argue, the Court's assertion that legislative
findings are "attenuated" is the way that the Court has
expressed skepticism over the true motivation for the law. Such
skepticism is what the Court had in mind, I suggest, when it
stated that it would not allow Congress to pile "inference upon
inference" to find a link to interstate commerce. 293 Following an
inference with another inference is problematic only when one
distrusts the inferences to begin with. In sum, the Rehnquist
Court ruled against the government in SWANCC and Morrison
in large part because it rejected as contrived the government's
assertions of congressional motivation.
Although it is often problematic, ascertaining motivation is
not an impossible task. Indeed, in 1991 Congress amended the
employment discrimination law to clarify that an employer is
liable whenever an impermissible factor, such as race or sex, was
a "motivating factor" in the employment decision to hire or
fire. 294
Of course this test might not be workable as a
constitutional standard for scrutinizing legislation. Even before
1937, when the Court routinely rejected legislation because of an
impermissible motivation, 295 the Court never resolved the
problem of mixed motivations. Relying on the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause, 296 one might argue that if Congress is
motivated even slightly by a desire to foster interstate
commerce, the law should be allowed to stand, in order to fulfill
this legitimate purpose. 297 On the other hand, if the Court truly
291 See SWANCC, 591 U.S. at 172-74.
292 See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 575-76 (1983) (holding that the
national government may resolve an interstate water dispute through a Special
Master).
293See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-68 (1995).
294See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071,

1075 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(m)).
299 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550
(1935) (disallowing congressional regulation of hours and wages).
296U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of
the Land ...").
297 See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (setting forth
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were to revert to a pre-1937 view and find that certain subject
matters are completely off limits to Congress, then mixed
motivation laws might be unsalvageable. 298 Second-guessing the
motivations of a legislature is bound to be a tricky matter. The
Rehnquist Court so far has not even acknowledged that this is
what it has done; in Lopez and Morrison, it trotted out its
assessment that the laws were too "attenuated" and left it at
that, 299 leaving the difficult details of doctrine to be filled in
either by lower courts or future cases.
However, the
development of a doctrine on motivation is needed in order to
create a coherent jurisprudence for a limited commerce power.
It may seem inconceivable that the Supreme Court could
rule that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
unconstitutional because it was motivated by a desire for social
justice and not by a motivation to foster interstate commerce.
Such a ruling would be a body-blow to the great national
commitment, which slowly came to fruition in the 1950s, '60s,
and '70s, that discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other
personal characteristics such as disabilities 30 0 is impermissible
in American society. 30 1 Accordingly, one should not expect the
Supreme Court to overturn Title VII anytime soon; such a step
would be, of course, politically explosive. But it would be a
logical result of the Rehnquist Court's new federalism.

the seminal view of the necessary powers of the national government).
298 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (striking down Virginia's
law banning marriages between two persons of different races, despite arguments of
the state's mixed motivations in passing the prohibition); see also Ugo Colella, Trust
the Tale, Not the Author, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1081, 1129-30 (1996) (arguing for closer
judicial scrutiny into the motive of a legislature when a law is alleged to have been
racially motivated); Kenneth Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1978) (displaying skepticism of inquiring into
motivation).
299 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
300 See Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
301 The outer limits of this commitment are being tested, of course, by
assertions that sexual orientation is a similarly immutable characteristic and
should receive similar protection. See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d
1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Sexual orientation and sexual identity are
immutable .... ). The inner limits of this commitment stop at the personal level,
where otherwise unlawful discrimination is still allowed in one's personal domestic
affairs, such as friendship and marriage.
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The Contrivance of Construction
In addition to its distrust of the contrivance of motivation,

the Rehnquist Court also revealed in SWANCC a skepticism of
the contorted means by which Congress sometimes drafts and
agencies sometimes interpret national laws.
I call this
contortion the contrivance of construction.
The Court in SWANCC barely restrained its exasperation
with the Army Corps' expansive interpretation of the Clean
Water Act, 30 2 even though the Court had no interpretative basis
for concluding that the agency's construction plainly was
inconsistent with the statute. 30 3 Rather, with a neat balancing
act, the Court managed both to avoid deferring to the
government and to avoid resolving the constitutional question.
By demanding a "clear indication" of congressional intent before
allowing an agency interpretation that "invokes the outer limits"
of the commerce power, the Court was able to reverse the usual
burden of proof in Commerce Clause challenges. 30 4 Finding no
"clear indication" from Congress, the Court was then free to
impose its own narrow statutory interpretation of "navigable
305
waters" that avoided addressing the constitutional issue.
Missing from the Court's reasoning, however, was a
thorough analysis of the critical question whether the
government's interpretation was indeed at the "outer limits" of
national power, as the Court assumed. The Corps' expansive
Migratory Bird Rule covered water bodies under section 404 if
they were habitat for migratory birds. 30 6 The agency argued that
its interpretation was permissible under the commerce power
because of the fact that millions of people spend over a billion
dollars annually on recreational pursuits relating to migratory
birds. 30 7
Because protecting migratory birds fosters this

302 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 168-69 (2001) (noting that the Army Corps'
original interpretation was narrower and further commenting that the government
"put forward no persuasive evidence" that this original interpretation was wrong).
303 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) (explaining that deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute
that it administers is required as long as the agency's determination is reasonable).
304 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
305 See id. at 172-73.
306 See id. at 163-64 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1999)) and Final Rule to
Regulating Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (Nov. 13,
1986)).
307 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
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commerce, the proposition went, the Migratory Bird Rule had a
significant effect on interstate commerce. 308
In my view,
protecting commerce related to migratory birds seems to be no
more at the "outer limits" of the Constitution than the regulation
of the landscaping of a closed strip mine 309 or the regulation of a
small company's practices regarding wages and labor
conditions, 3 10 just to name two of the laws that the Court decades
ago held to be within the commerce power. But the Rehnquist
Court refused to assess the government's arguments on their
merits. Instead it returned to its requirement that the Corps
prove that Congress intended such a result, 311 invoked the
supposed "tradition" of state control over land and water use,
31 2
and ended its analysis.
The Rehnquist Court's logical and argumentative short-cuts
can be explained by recognizing the Court's annoyance with the
government's boot-strapping on the venerable term "navigable
waters" to construct a large-scale regime for environmental
protection. Indeed, the Court in SWANCC concluded its only
paragraph devoted to the supposed effect of the law on interstate
commerce with the dismissive, "[b]ut this a far cry, indeed, from
the 'navigable waters' and 'waters of the United States' to which
the statute by its term extends." 313 The crux of the annoyance is
this: How could "navigable waters" end up meaning waters that
plainly are not navigable? The answer lies in the history of the
contrived creation and administration of the Clean Water Act.

308 Id. Not asserted as vigorously were arguments that migratory birds
themselves are "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce and that the Supreme

Court had already upheld congressional protection of migratory birds in Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920) (upholding the authority of Congress to enact
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 in large part because the Act enforced
provisions of treaties with foreign nations).
309See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277-80
(1981) (explaining that regulating surface coal mining was within Congress's
commerce power because Congress rationally determined that the activity affected
commerce and that determination was entitled to deference).
310 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941) (finding that
regulating small business's practices regarding wages and labor conditions was
within the commerce power because it was a reasonable means to a legitimate end).
311 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
312 Id. at 174.
313 Id. at 173. Although it might have been a far cry from "navigable waters," it
was not a far cry from the much broader "waters of the United States." See 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
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Congressional regulation of the nation's navigable waters
began with the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,314 which made it
a crime to dump "refuse" into a "navigable water" or a tributary
of such water, unless permitted by the Army Corps upon a
finding that the dumping would not injure "anchorage and
navigation."' 3 15 According to at least one scholar of water law,
the statute was nearly forgotten by the 1960s, when the first
generation of national environmental advocates encouraged
prosecutions under the Act. 3 16 This "discovery" of a national
pollution control statute, even if its effectiveness had been
limited in practice,3 17 was a major impetus to Congress's passage
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, which largely
supplanted the Rivers and Harbors Act and the provisions of an
older national water pollution act that similarly had addressed
318
"navigable waters."
During congressional consideration of draft legislation for
the new water law in 1971 and 1972, various bills used the thenfamiliar term "navigable waters" to define the statute's reach. In
an enlightening history of the act, Professor William Funk
explained that the leading sponsors of the Act intended that
"'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation."' 319 Congress intended to cover all waters related
to interstate commerce, even if the water bodies were not
navigable, Funk maintained, which Congress expressed with the
definition of navigable waters as "the waters of the United
States." 320
As to why Congress employed the seemingly
outmoded term "navigable waters," Funk suggested that "the
answer must be that Congress believed its power to regulate

314 Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (currently codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407).
15 Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152, § 13. For a discussion of the history and
interpretation of the Rivers and Harbors Act, also called the Refuse Act, see PLATER
ET AL., supra note 183, at 322-27.
316 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 183, at 322-23.
317 See id. at 323-24 (arguing that although business interests and President
Nixon's Justice Department expressed concern over the potential for the statute to
become a powerful tool for suits to stop water pollution, environmentalists made

little headway inthe courts).
318See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155,
superseded by Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
319 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, 92d Cong. 131 (1972); Funk, supra note 120, at
10748-49.
320 See Funk, supra note 120, at 10748.
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water did not extend beyond navigable waters broadly
defined."3 21 Less clear is how Congress could sensibly "broadly
define" a narrow term such as navigable waters. The suggestion
does not clarify why congressional drafters continued to use
"navigable waters" if they intended it to include waters that
were plainly not navigable in the commonsense or dictionary
meaning of the term. I suggest alternative explanations. The
drafters either did not understand how to invoke the full extent
of the modern commerce power-which would include regulation
of all water pollution that "significantly affect[s] interstate
commerce" 322-- or they simply borrowed the most familiar term
in national water regulation, "navigable waters," tacked on a
contradictory definition, "waters of the United States," and left it
to the administrative agencies and the courts to sort out the
contrivance.
Faced with this contrived statutory command and prodded
by the EPA and environmental litigants, the Army Corps
developed its Migratory Bird Rule. 323 The Corps created a
distinction based on whether or not the body of water was bird
habitat-a rough but reasonable decision, in light of existing
Commerce Clause precedent 324-but nonetheless a distinction
that had no basis whatsoever in the text of the Clean Water Act
itself. The Army Corps could and should have supported its
interpretation with an explanation of why the Migratory Bird
Rule was justified by existing judicial interpretations of the
scope of the commerce power. 325 The Army Corps also should
have explained in its rule making documents that protecting
migratory bird habitat fosters the significant interstate

321

Id.

322 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59; Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964).
323 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 164 (2001); see also Funk, supra note 120, at

10748-49.
324 The Migratory Bird Rule also covered waters that were used to irrigate
crops sold in interstate commerce and that were a habitat for endangered species.
See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164 (quoting Final Rule for Regulatory programs of the
Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41216, 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986)). From cases such as
Katzenbach and Hodel, the Supreme Court had by the 1980s permitted national
regulation of activity that "affected commerce" or provided some sort of interstate
hook. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 301-02; Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981).
325 See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299-301 (determining that national regulation
is permitted if it affects interstate commerce).
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commerce associated with recreation and the hunting of birds. 326
Instead, however, the Army Corps promulgated its rule with
little regulatory explanation and without the notice and
comment procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure
Act 327-omissions that seem to have exacerbated the Supreme
Court's perception that the Army Corps' construction was
unacceptably contrived. 328 As a result, the vulnerabilities laid by
Congress's contradictory drafting in 1972 were resolved, thirty
years later in SWANCC, with disastrous results for nationalism
and environmentalism.
In light of the Rehnquist Court's skeptical new federalism, it
is worthwhile to explore whether other public-spirited laws are
likely to engender displeasure over the contrivance of
construction, as revealed in SWANCC. Unfortunately for social
welfare legislation, the Court may not have far to go to uncover
similar contrivances in a range of national statutes. In this
section, I briefly note some potentially vulnerable provisions in
the arena of environmental law.
In light of the contrivances implicated by section 404 of the
Clean Water Act, it is not surprising that this provision became
the first section of a major federal statute to incur the wrath of
the Rehnquist Court's revived federalism. Industrial polluters
are already attempting to use SWANCC to limit the reach of the
Clean Water Act's regulation of industrial point source
discharges. 329 If the federal courts apply SWANCC broadly,
See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (citing Corps data about the commerce
associated with migratory birds).
327 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2000).
328 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164 n.1 (faulting the Army Corps for its rule
making short-cut).
329 So far, only a few courts have touched the issue of whether industrial point
source pollution, regulated under section 301(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), is
similarly limited by SWANCCs narrow reading of "navigable waters." In Laguna
Gatuna,Inc. v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 336 (2001), the EPA withdrew a cease and
desist order against a polluter of an isolated New Mexico lake, apparently because
of a fear that the lake was not a navigable water. See id. at 340. A crucial issue that
other courts have touched on is whether SWANCCs removal of "isolated" waters
from the coverage of the Act means isolation as a matter of surface water, or
whether a lake can be considered "adjacent" to navigable-in-fact waters by
underground hydrology. As a practical matter, stopping pollution from reaching
navigable-in-fact waters would justify regulation of lakes that are hydrologically
connected through groundwater. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
held that man-made irrigation canals are "navigable waters," see Headwaters, Inc.
v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2001), while the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that discharges that seep into groundwater
326
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industrial polluters would no longer be restricted by national law
from dumping into isolated wetlands or intrastate lakes, perhaps
including one as large as Utah's Great Salt Lake. 330 Such a
result would be consistent with the Court's view that regulation
of land and water must return to the exclusive realm of state
332
law. 331 It would also transform the law of pollution control.
333
Similarly vulnerable would be key provisions of the ESA.
In recent years, environmental advocates have made
increasingly bold use of the statute's prohibition against "take" of
334
endangered species, even by private parties on private land.
As interpreted by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 335 the
"take" provision potentially limits a variety of land or waterdisturbing activities, such as the logging of a forest that is home
to an endangered migratory bird,33 6 a town's permitting bright
lights to shine on a beach where turtles hatch, 337 and sheep338
grazing on plants that are the food for a rare island bird.
near navigable waters are not covered by federal law, see Rice v. Harken
Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 2001). For a discussion of the issue,
see FD & P Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 511-17
(D.N.J. 2003).
330 If a large but single-state lake such as the Great Salt Lake or Florida's Lake
Okeechobee is not part of interstate navigation, it would seem that national
regulation of the lake would not be constitutionally permitted under SWANCC's
logic, even though the lakes are navigable-in-fact, unless the government were able
to show that a particular activity on the lake significantly affected interstate
commerce. But see Colvin v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1055 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (finding that California's large Salton Sea is a "navigable water" covered by
the Clean Water Act). The constitutional justification should be made in regard to
the activity that is regulated, not simply by general reference to the body of water.
Neither Congress in the Clean Water Act nor the Court in SWANCC was willing to
make such an analysis, however.
331 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
332 See Funk, supra note 120, at 10741, 10770-72 (noting that SWANCC could
portend a major change in water pollution control).
333 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
:134 See Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. v. Babbitt, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1156,
1173-74 (D.N.M. 2000). The ESA's take provision is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a).
335 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
336 See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
that logging may cause an unlawful "take" of a bird that relies on the forest).
.3 See Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 148 F.3d 1231, 1258 (11th Cir.
1998) (approving preliminary injunction). Lights that shine on the beaches of sea
turtles can disorient hatchlings, which crawl toward low-lying nighttime light,
which in their natural settings exist only in the moon's reflection off the sea. Id. at
1235.
338 See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 110910 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming decision prohibiting sheep grazing where the Palila
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Because of its potential to restrict private land and water
use, the ESA has been a target of federalist challenges. So far,
most efforts have failed. In 1998, a construction-business group
challenged the government's decision to list as endangered the
obscure delhi sands flower-loving fly. 339 Because the inch-long

fly lives only in California and has no known connection to
commerce, the group argued that protection was beyond
Congress's commerce power. 340 The D.C. Circuit upheld the
listing, finding among other things that preservation of any
endangered species protects unique and potentially commercially
valuable genetic material.3 41 The Fourth Circuit echoed the D.C.
Circuit in a challenge to regulations concerning the
reintroduction of the endangered red wolf to North Carolina.
The court held that the interstate tourist travel to "howling
events" was, among other factors, sufficient to support national
342
protection of the wolf pursuant to the commerce power.
Application of the ESA's older cousin, the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA), 343 enacted in 1918, has also expanded with
the years to address private commercial activity. Once primarily
directed at hunting, the MBTA has recently been applied to
regulate such non-malicious acts as the maintenance of
uninsulated power lines that are known to kill migratory birds,
which led to a successful criminal prosecution against a rural
electric cooperative. 344
Although the federal courts have so far upheld the broad
applications of the national wildlife statutes, the new federalism
might soon bring them within its sights. In Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,345 handed

down just weeks after Lopez, a divided Supreme Court rejected
an argument that the expansive administrative regulations for
the ESA's "take" prohibition contradicted congressional intent. 346
bird's food source grows).
339 See Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1997); see also Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(rejecting an argument that SWANCC discredited Nat' Ass'n of Homebuilders).
340 See Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders, 130 F.3d at 1050-54.
341 See id. at 1052-53.
342 See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 494 (4th Cir. 2000).
343 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-716 (2000).
344 See United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1071,
1082-83 (D. Colo. 1999) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
345 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
346 See id. at 708.
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With a somewhat reluctant Justice O'Connor joining the
majority, the Court approved of applying the ESA to private land
347
use that unintentionally harms an endangered species.
However, a spirited dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued that the ESA's
"take" proscription should be limited to hunting. 348 Although the
Commerce Clause question was not briefed or addressed in
Sweet Home, the ESA and the MBTA seem likely candidates for
critical scrutiny by the Rehnquist Court's federalists. Following
its criticism in SWANCC of the expansion of the Clean Water
Act from its "navigable waters" roots, the Rehnquist Court might
well conclude that the ESA and MBTA have been contrived to
serve broad environmentalist purposes without sufficient
statutory or commerce power supports. It is not difficult to see
parallels between the administrative expansion of water
regulation struck down in SWANCC and, as the Sweet Home
dissenters argued, 349 the extension of the wildlife laws to restrict
land and water activities.
Indeed, some of the hardest fought epics of American civil
litigation, as well as some of the biggest victories of
environmentalism, have come through assertive application of
the ESA as a regulator of land that serves as habitat. For
example, in the Pacific Northwest during the 1990s, the
northern spotted owl's need to nest in old trees led to, as
environmentalists saw it, unprecedented legal attention to
protecting old-growth forests, or, as loggers viewed it, a
devastating twist of a federal statute to depress an essential part
of the local economy. 350 A veteran advocate of endangered
species protection has suggested that the potential clout of the
ESA was hidden by verbal "camouflage" during the drafting of
the Act, critical requirements of which are unclear even after
repeated readings. 351 Congress employed a similar burrowing
technique with the keystone requirement of an environmental
impact statement in section 102(2)(C) of the National

,47 See id. at 708-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
348 See id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
349 See id. at 715.
350 For a discussion of the northern spotted owl controversy and its tangled
litigation, from a pro-environmentalist perspective, see PLATER ET AL., supra note
183, at 674-84.
351 See id. at 657, 666.
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Environmental Policy Act, enacted in 1970.352 Both the ESA and
NEPA are popular with environmental advocates because of
their potential to stop planned construction projects in their
tracks for failure to follow appropriate procedures. Indeed, when
other efforts fail, some environmentalists admit to turning to the
bureaucratic hurdles of these statutes as a last resort to try to
353
secure at least a delay in ground-disturbing activities.
Although all diligent attorneys pursue a variety of
arguments to further their client's interests, the aggressive
application of the environmental statutes may encourage the
Rehnquist Court's federalists to use the Commerce Clause to
batten down what they perceive as contrivances of the laws, as
they did in SWANCC. Advocates of private property rights have
already tried, as I have noted, to challenge aspects of the ESA in
the federal appellate courts. So far, the Supreme Court has not
decided a Commerce Clause challenge to the ESA, MBTA, or
NEPA. If and when it does, however, it is quite conceivable that
the Court could limit the reach of the statute to sustain the
"tradition" of state authority over land and water use, as it did in
SWANCC.
Even if the Court does not go so far as to declare
unconstitutional an entire statute, it is likely to look for ways to
nibble at the edges of the law when it detects the contrivances of
motivation or construction, just as it gnawed at the Clean Water
Act in SWANCC. 354 Particularly vulnerable are regimes that
combine both the contrivances of motivation and constructionthat is, where a statute primarily serves the purpose of
352 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
353 See, e.g., PLATER ET AL., supra note 183, at 659-62, 667-68.
Plater
explained how opponents of the planned Tellico Dam in the 1970s first used NEPA

and then the ESA, with the famous snail darter case that went to the Supreme
Court, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), to delay completion of the dam, which was
eventually completed. See PLATER ET AL. supra note 183, at 659-71. Similarly,
opponents of the Navy's bombing on the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, sought out
and found provisions of environmental law that gave them victories on the merits,
but did not secure them injunctive relief. See id. at 667-68 (citing Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982)).
354 I agree with Professor William Funk that SWANCC is a fairly substantial
bite. Funk has suggested that SWANCC "may be the most devastating judicial
opinion affecting the environment ever," as it restricts coverage of the Clean Water
Act's section 404 program away from perhaps as much as 80 percent of the nation's
"wetlands"-areas that are sometimes wet and sometimes dry, such as marshes and
swamps-and perhaps even away from single-state lakes such as Utah's Great Salt
Lake. See Funk, supra note 120, at 10741, 10745.
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furthering social welfare, not interstate commerce, and where a
crafty drafter or an exuberant administrative agency has
inflated its coverage. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act may
have fulfilled both contrivances. So might have, before Congress
finally codified it in 1991, the judicially created doctrine of
unlawful race discrimination by "disparate impact" under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which exposed even
seemingly dispassionate requirements such as employment tests
and job qualifications to the exacting scrutiny of the federal
courts.3 55 In the environmental realm, we should expect more
Similarly
challenges to the ESA, MBTA, and NEPA. 35 6
3
57
vulnerable in the Superfund statute might be the practice of
the EPA of ordering private parties to clean up hazardous waste
spills in situations in which there is only a remote risk of
contamination to humans, and a remote link to interstate
commerce.3 5 8 Exposure of such vulnerabilities is the logical next
step of the Rehnquist Court's new federalism.
IV. THE CONTRIVANCE OF LIBERTARIANISM

The idea that federalism fosters freedom is as old as the
nation.
In The Federalist, James Madison argued that by
restricting the powers of the national government, the
Constitution would advance liberty because citizens would face
Adherents of political
only one level of government. 359
libertarianism continue to echo Madison's linkage of federalism
to freedom, although today's contentious political debates tend to
focus on the benefits of laissez-faire in the marketplace and the
putative rights of personal and business property. 360 Indeed, the
355 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26, 436 (1971) (creating

the doctrine of discrimination by "disparate impact"). Disparate impact was made
an explicit part of Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Pub. L. 102-166,
§§106, 107, 105 Stat. 1074, 1074-1076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k) (2000)).
356 The ESA hook would be the no "take" provision, 16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1)(B)(C) (2000).
357 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
358 See id. § 9606(a) (giving authority to issue orders for remedial action when
there is an imminent threat of endangerment).
359 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, 321-24 (James Madison). The notion that
Congress might largely supplant state legislatures was not within Madison's
thinking and has never entered the mainstream of American political or
jurisprudential thought.
360 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32
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libertarian-oriented law school organization calls itself The
Federalist Society. 36 1
Perhaps the leading libertarian
commentator in American law, Professor Richard Epstein,
argued years before Lopez that "the great peril of national
regulation is that it may be taken too far, to impose national
362
uniformity which frustrates, rather than facilities markets."
Variations among state laws, Epstein wrote, constitute
"competitive market[s]," thus serving as "powerful instruments
8' 63
for human happiness and well-being."
Even a more moderate commentator, Professor Louise
Weinberg, has written that the chief benefit of limiting national
power is to avoid an "abuse of national prerogatives."' 364 The
reason to fear nationalism, Weinberg contended, is the risk that
unfettered national power might lead to mass "propoganda,"
such as through a nationally run school system or a national

(1992) (stating that the government may not regulate to deprive a landowner of the
complete value of the property unless the regulation reflects traditional nuisance
law or the government provides just compensation); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (holding that the national government
may regulate public accommodations).
361The Federalist Society is dedicated to "conservative and libertarian ideals.
See www.fed-soc.org/ourpurpose.htm (last visited Jul. 18, 2003).
362 Epstein, supra note 45, at 1454.
363 Id. at 1453. Not all libertarians, however, are federalists. Professor Charles
Fried, Solicitor General under President Reagan, has written skeptically of the
notion that reliance on state as opposed to national government is likely to lead to
more liberty. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 186-87 (1990). The "village
tyrant," Fried wrote, can be as arbitrary in abuse of his power as the national
government. Id.
From a more humorous stance, journalist P.J. O'Rourke, a former 1960s
student-radical who turned conservative, has argued that hallowed institutions of
local democracy, such as the New Hampshire "Blatherboro" town meetings in which
he participates, are as venal and threatening to liberty as big government. See P.J.
O'ROURKE, PARLIAMENT OF WHORES 223-33 (1991). In particular, local government

is the authority that most often infringes on private real property rights. Writing of
his town's voting to block a private property owner from building a golf course on his
own land-with O'Rourke voting with the majority-he concluded:
The whole idea of government is this: If enough people get together and act
in concert, they can take something and not pay for it ..... What we were
trying to do with our legislation in the Blatherboro Town Meeting was
wanton, cheap, and greedy-a sluttish thing. This should come as no
surprise. Authority has always attracted the lowest elements in the human
race.... Every government is a parliament of whores ....The trouble is,
in a democracy the whores are us.
Id. at 232-33.
364 Weinberg, supranote 202, at 1330.
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police force. 36 5 Weinberg's apprehension is a centrist variant of
the beliefs of right-of-center anti-nationalists who fear national
gun control as a first step toward totalitarianism and who
distrust the United Nations, which is the ultimate high-level
government. 366 Indeed, historians note that a key move in the
Nazis' takeover of Germany in 1933 was their abolition of the
traditionally strong German state governments, including those
of Bavaria, which had a history of Catholic-oriented moderation,
and of Prussia, in which left-wing socialism was strong. 367
There should be no doubt that the Rehnquist Court's
majorities in Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC took seriously the
purported "liberty" benefits of federalism. In Lopez, the Court
wrote that the restriction on federal power "was adopted by the
Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties." 368
While neither Morrison nor SWANCC relied on liberty per
se-the defendant in Morrison, after all, was trying to avoid a
civil claim arising from an alleged rape 369 and the plaintiff in
SWANCC was a local governmental body 37 0-the federalistfriendly justices on the Rehnquist Court have made known their
skepticism of excessive governmental authority over private
citizens in the economic sphere. Chief Justice Rehnquist, author
of SWANCC, Morrison, and Lopez, penned a famous dissent in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 371 that in 1978
helped rekindle the jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment's
right against uncompensated "taking,"3 72 which is the
Constitution's chief limitation on government regulation of
.15 Id. at 1332-36.
366 See, e.g., Editorial, Guns, Guns, Guns, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Apr. 22,

2002, at AS, (stating conservative scorn of gun control), available at 2002 WL
7197974; Robert Holland, But UN's Globalization Adds Nuttiness to the Mix,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 22, 1997, at A15, (giving conservative skepticism

of global solutions of the United Nations), availableat 1997 WL 7632759.
367 See, e.g., WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 200
(Simon & Schuster 1990) (1959). With the statement, "[t]he state governments from
now on are merely administrative bodies of the Reich," the Nazis were able to
eliminate other political parties and consolidate their totalitarian power. See id. at
200.
368 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
3r9 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602-04 (2000).
370 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 162-63 (2001).
371 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
372 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Penn. Centr. Transp., 438 U.S. at 141-53
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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private property. Since joining the Court in 1986, Justice Scalia
has written many of the Court's most scathing opinions of
perceived government overreaching on private property, such as
his equation of government land use regulation with "extortion"
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.3 3 Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas
have formed the foundation of the court's advocacy both of
34
private property rights and of federalism.
The role of libertarianism is the under appreciated
impetus to the Rehnquist Court's new federalism. Scholars and
litigants who are puzzled by the Court's logical gyrations3 7 5 in
Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC have often failed to acknowledge
the impetus of this political philosophy. While scholars of the
commerce power often speak of the debate over federalism as
concerning a choice between national law and state law, 376 this
characterization fails to capture the gist of many of the leading
controversies. Many of the most important and contentious
federalist debates actually concern whether to govern at allthat is, whether to regulate the citizens through national law or
whether to leave them to their own devices, as state law would
permit.
The nationalists' "race to the bottom" argument, for
instance, is predicated on the assumption that states wish to
enact social legislation but are discouraged from doing so by fear
of competition for business from other states-a prisoner's
377
dilemma that can only be relieved by national intervention.
Although this dilemma may exist for some issues, it is not the
scenario that has played out in many controversies of public
policy and law.
From health and safety regulation37 8 to
373 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 432
A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
374 See, for example, Palazzolo u. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), for the
Court's latest major statement on the Fifth Amendment's right against
uncompensated takings, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas formed the majority.
375 See, e.g., MASSEY, supra note 8, at 183 (calling Lopez and Morrison
"anomalous").
376 See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 202, at 1319 (referring to the issue of
federalism as being national "encroachment on state governance").
377 See, e.g., Engel, supra note 62, at 304-05 (concluding that many state
legislators are fearful of losing business to other states as a result of interstate
competition arising from lack of uniform national environmental standards).
378 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905) (evaluating the
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employment conditions 37 9 to race and gender discrimination 38 0 to
environmental protections, 38 ' many of the greatest debates of
law over the past century have concerned whether government
should interfere at all with the freedoms of society and the
marketplace. The battles between regulation and libertarianism
are not merely skirmishes over whether to choose a national or a
state dialect, but rather constitute a war between completely
different languages of social construction.
A high-water mark of the nationalist approach to the
Commerce Clause, 1964's Katzenbach v. McClung 82 revealed the
contrasting approaches to government. It is unlikely that the
Alabama legislature in the early 1960s was constrained by fear
of interstate competition from enacting a law requiring Ollie's
Barbeque to serve African-Americans; rather, the prevailing
political view in Alabama at the time-at least as reflected in its
white-dominated politics--was that Ollie's Barbeque and places
like it should be allowed to discriminate. 38 3 Likewise, in the
more recent dispute resolved in SWANCC, it seems likely that
Illinois allowed pond-filling not because it feared competition but
because it preferred the economic benefits of filling ponds to
ecological protection. Libertarianism is followed voluntarily, not
384
reluctantly.
This is not to concede, however, that federalism is inherently
friendlier to freedom than is nationalism. The American system
of cooperative federalism among the national and state
governments often results in more regulation than would exist
with exclusively national law. Most prominent national statutes
set only a floor for regulation. In the environmental realm, for

constitutionality of New York's regulation of working hours for bakers).
371 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
549-51 (1935) (dealing with the constitutionality of national regulation of minimum
wages and other labor standards).
380 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (determining the
constitutionality of state school segregation by race).
381 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992)
(deciding the constitutionality of state land use regulation).
:182Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (evaluating the
constitutionality of national regulation of restaurants).
:18:1See id. at 298 (stating that there was no contention that the government
forced the restaurant to discriminate).
:384This is not to say that states never refrain from regulation out of a fear of
competition. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
281-82 (1981) (relying in part on competition theory).
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example, both the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act permit
states to adopt pollution controls that go beyond the national
laws, if they so desire. 38 5 Similarly, the Superfund law specifies
386
that the national statute does not affect state tort law,
meaning that a party that has contributed to a spill of hazardous
waste may be liable through state tort standards even if the
national law provides no remedy. Likewise, in the realm of
discrimination law, many states have enacted rights and
remedies for alleged victims of discrimination that go beyond
those provided in the national Civil Rights Act of 1964.387 Even
for national statutes that do not explicitly permit states to go
further, the jurisprudence of the Commerce Clause usually
allows states to supplement national law with tighter state
requirements. Courts restrain supplemental state laws only in
the occasional case in which (1) Congress has explicitly
preempted state law, such as in the case of motor vehicle
emissions--with limited exceptions; 38 8 (2) there is a real conflict
between national law and state law that makes it impossible for
a party to comply with both; 38 9 or (3) a "dormant" Commerce
Clause prevents state regulation in the absence of national law,
which usually occurs when states discriminate against out-ofstate commerce or unnecessarily hinder interstate traffic. 390 The
385 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2000) (Clean

Air Act).
38G 42 U.S.C. § 9672.
387 See, e.g., Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and

§ 3604(C): A New Look at the Fair Housing Act's Most Intriguing Provision, 29
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 187, 275 n.402 (2001) (discussing state housing
discrimination laws that go beyond the national law).
388 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (indicating that states may not adopt "any standard
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles"). This preemption
ensures that manufacturers will not have to make multiple variations of autos to
comply with varying state standards. Exceptions include a waiver process for more
stringent state standards adopted before 1966, id. § 7543(b), and the limited "clean
fuel vehicle" program that applies to California and a few other states that choose to
adopt it, id. at §§ 7581-7590.
389 See, e.g., California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 582
(1987) (allowing a state land-use regulation to co-exist with an arguably conflicting
federal environmental regulation).
390 See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981)
(striking down an Iowa regulation of double-trailer trucks because of its hindrance
on interstate commerce); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
(announcing a "virtually per se rule of invalidity" against a state's protectionism of
its own commerce against out-of-state competition). Many of the facially neutral
statutes that have been struck down involve situations, such as in Kassel, in which
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result is that American federalism typically provides for two
levels of regulation on business-more than if the law were
strictly national or strictly state. 391 Thus, it is a gross oversimplification to equate federalism with liberty, despite a long
392
history of doing so.
The salient libertarian result of restricting national power
would be to permit a minority of states that disagree with the
presumably
sways the national
majority view-which
government-to follow their own course of limited regulation. If
the Supreme Court were to declare the bulk of the national
laws
and
anti-discrimination
laws
environmental
unconstitutional-the stuff of dreams, no doubt, for some
libertarians 393 -many if not most states would then enter the
breach. Some states might stop short of the old national laws,
perhaps out of fear of dissuading business. However, if the
safety promises of environmentalism are as important to citizens
as is often suggested, 394 we might expect many states to appease
voters by vigorously instituting new state environmental

the state law might have been a ruse for discrimination under the guise of public
safety. Beyond this, the doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause for facially
neutral state laws is far from clear. See ENGDAHL, supra note 151, at 248-57
(exploring the ambiguity of the scope of the Commerce Clause and the power it gives
the states).
391 This is not to say that either national or state law would remain unchanged
if the United States were to follow a strictly national or strictly state regulatory
system. If a solely national system was in place, advocates of regulation, especially
from those states that are amenable to tougher regulation, would try harder to
adopt more stringent national laws. Under a state system, advocates of regulation
would certainly fight for stricter state laws because of the absence of a national floor
for legislation.
392 For another example, consider the typical progressive view of the role of the
federal judiciary. Because progressive federal court judges have led the way on
matters such as the rights of minority groups, the rights of the accused, and the
freedom of speech from the 1940s to the 1970s, many left-of-center advocates
continue to view the federal courts as their first choice for vindicating their policy
aims, despite the fact that the federal judiciary as a whole today may be no more
liberal than Congress or many state legislatures. See, e.g., Patrick Todd Mullins,
The Militia Clauses, The National Guard, and Federalism:A Constitutional Tug of
War, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 328, 348-49 (1988) ("[T]he federal courts, not the state
governments, are viewed as the vanguard protectors of individual rights.").
393 See Epstein, supra note 45, at 1443-54 (criticizing the New Deal expansion
of the commerce power to social justice laws, such as labor statutes, in large part on
libertarian grounds).
394 See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE,AND POLICY 8 (3d ed. 2000) (noting the consistency of polls showing public
support for environmental protection).
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standards. Likewise, if the Court were to set aside the national
antidiscrimination laws, they would be replaced in effect by the
extant state anti-discrimination laws that have been adopted in
varying forms in nearly all states.3 95 Libertarianism would
prevail only in a minority of states.
Perhaps because of their orientation toward economics,
many federalists perceive the "race to the bottom" assertion to be
among the most formidable of the arguments for nationalism. 39G
Federalist responses, however, appear to be a mixed bag: Some
federalists sometimes deny that policy-forcing competition
between states exists at all, while others say that it is a good
thing that the competition exists. Professor Jonathan Adler, an
economically oriented federalist, has commented in the wake of
SWANCC that "[t]here is little reason to believe that interstate
competition among states will produce a 'race-to-the-bottom' in
environmental regulation today, if it ever did."397 Because many

citizens cherish environmental protections, state legislators
attract votes by adopting such laws. 398

He noted that some

states with the highest concentration of wetlands, the water
bodies for which SWANCC largely left the states to regulate,
hold the strongest laws to protect these wetlands. 399 Adler
concluded that state control is usually preferable because
decisions of policy are best made by those closest to the matter,
especially for site-specific issues such as environmental
400
choices.
By contrast, Professor Richard Epstein has been plain in his
assessment that federalism is better because it does engender
competition among the states. 401 Such competition, he asserted,
discourages regulation and encourages market solutions. 402
Indeed, one of the most provocative conservative political ideas
of the twentieth century was the local government choice theory

395See, e.g., Schwemm, supra note 387, at 275 n.402 (listing fair housing laws).
396 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 65, at 207-08; Epstein, supra note 45, at 144344.
:97 Adler, supra note 65, at 207-08.
398 See

id. at 207-08, 224-25.
399See id. at 229 (citing JON A. KUSLER, STATE WETLAND REGULATION: STATUS
OF PROGRAMS AND EMERGING TRENDS 3 (1994)).
400 Adler, supra note 65, at 230 (citing F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 521-22 (1945)).
4o See Epstein, supra note 45, at 1443-44.
402 See id. at 1451-55.
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of Charles Tiebout, who argued that competition among
jurisdictions allows citizens to choose the sort of government
they prefer-poor persons who desire subsidized government
services may choose to live in a service-friendly city; whereas
more tax-conscious citizens who need little from government
may choose a low-tax and low-service suburb. 40 3 Although
advocates for the poor see this effect as potentially crippling to
social obligations to the disadvantaged, 40 4 Tiebout characterized
the process as a means of providing for a voluntary and efficient
"market" for government services. 40 5
It is revealing that the nationalist Commerce Clause opinion
that Professor Epstein has reviled most vociferously was
Wickard v. Filburn,40 6 the case upholding national control of
homegrown wheat. 40 7 Wickard seems to me to be among the
most rational of the expansive commerce power decisions in that
it focused on the practicalquestion of whether the law served to
control an aspect of interstate commerce. Congress in the 1940s
desired to prop up prices in the national wheat market, which
even skeptics should admit is "interstate commerce." As a
result, Congress had to be able to regulate activities that would
affect the national market, such as the consumption of homegrown wheat. This economic argument, however, was not
persuasive to Epstein because of the Court's tacit approval of the
"disaster" of an idea that markets are suspect and that
government "cartels" are preferable. 40 8 While Epstein did not go
so far as to use the word "socialism," this is in effect what he was
40 9
complaining about.
The flaw of criticizing price controls through constitutional
law is, of course, that neither the commerce power nor anything
else in the Constitution prohibits price-fixing, regardless of how
objectionable it may appear to libertarians. To reprise the

403 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL.
ECON. 416, 416-24 (1956).
404 See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, E Pluribus Unum Urbs: An Exploration of the
Potential Benefits of Metropolitan Government on Efforts to Assist Poor Persons, 5
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 471, 503-04 (1998) (discussing the adverse effects of
competition on poverty assistance).
405 See Tiebout, supra note 403, at 416-24.
406 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
407 See id. at 127-28.
408 See Epstein, supra note 45, at 1451-53.
409

See id.
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famous dissent of Justice Holmes nearly a century ago in
Lochner v. New York, the Constitution "does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"4 10 referring to an influential
nineteenth century variant of Adam Smith's free market
theories. 41 1 Libertarianism is not enshrined in the Constitution.
The commonly asserted federalist syllogism that the Court
should interpret the Commerce Clause narrowly because James
Madison believed in a limited national government 4 12 seems to
me no more satisfying as an interpretative principle than a
nationalist reliance on the fact that other conventioneers in 1787
wanted to give Congress sufficient power to address all "general
The purported benefits of
interests of the union."4 13
libertarianism should be touted and tested in the arena of
politics, not through constitutional claims in the federal courts.
To wield the commerce power as a libertarian tool for
dismantling much of national public welfare legislation, as some
nationalists fear the Rehnquist majority has in mind, 414 is as
counter-textual and contrived as the nationalists' arguments at
their most extreme.
V. NEW PATHS FOR NATIONALISM
With its slowly developing jurisprudence of the commerce
power, the Rehnquist Court has placed nationalism on the
defensive. Congressional assertions of a link between regulation
and interstate commerce are no longer protected by deference

410 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing HERBERT SPENCER,
SOCIAL STATICS (New York, D. Appleton & Company 1896)).
411 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (London, W. Strahan & T. Cadell 1776).
412 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, TranslatingFederalism:United States v. Lopez,
1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 192-93 (1995) (arguing "[t]hat to be faithful to the
constitutional structure, the Court must be willing to be unfaithful to the
constitutional text"); see also Clark, supra note 13, at 1162-66 (criticizing Professor
Lessig and arguing for a more moderate federalist approach).
413 See Regan, supra note 51, at 555-56 (quoting NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 380 (W.W. Norton &
Co. ed., 1966)).
414 See Epstein, supra note 45, at 1454-55 (arguing for the difficult-butadvisable course of "dismantling... large portions of the modern federal
government"); Jamie Y. Tanabe, The Commerce Clause New Pendulum: Will Federal
Environmental Law Survive in the Post-SWANCC Epoch of "New Federalism"?, 31
ENVTL. L. 1051, 1081-87 (2001) (expressing fear that the Rehnquist Court will
strike down additional environmental laws).
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and rational review, at least in certain cases. 415 Instead, the
Court has staked out an aggressive new stance in scrutinizing
national legislation. As I have argued, the most salient feature
of this new assertiveness has been the Court's contrivance of
"tradition" as a means for invalidating legislation, regardless of
its otherwise valid relation to interstate commerce. Less overt
but no less a contrivance is the current of libertarianism in the
new federalism. At the same time, however, the Rehnquist
Court's commerce power jurisprudence plainly is not a
juggernaut. The recent SWANCC decision was the first instance
in which a component of a major federal statute fell to the
Court's new federalism. Statutory provisions that may suffer the
same fate as section 404 of the Clean Water Act include those
that are vulnerable because their own contrivances of motivation
or construction, as in SWANCC. Some national statutes may be
vulnerable on one or both grounds.
How could nationalism regain the offensive when, as is
inevitable, the federalists train their sights on other provisions
of national law? I suggest that nationalists can do more than
simply hope to turn the clock back to pre-Lopez deference. I
briefly propose here four ideas that are worth pursuing, either in
arguing commerce power cases in court or, perhaps more
importantly, in drafting and administering statutes so that they
are less vulnerable to begin with.
A.

Alternative ConstitutionalPowers

First, the national government may attempt to justify
legislation through powers other than the interstate Commerce
Clause. As noted above, some scholars have argued that antidiscrimination legislation is logically supported by the
Reconstruction amendments to the Constitution, 416 which were
designed to limit racial discrimination. 41 7 For those jurists who
are uneasy about using the commerce power to justify social

415 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981), the Court followed a rational basis test for review of congressional findings
as to the link with interstate commerce. After United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
563-64 (1995), the Court has all but abandoned the notion of deference, even if it
has not stated so.
416 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
417 See, e.g., Regan, supra note 51, at 595-96.
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welfare legislation, the Reconstruction amendments might
provide such laws with a more suitable justification.
Indeed, the government argued in Morrison that the
Violence Against Women Act was supportable as an exercise of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 418 which requires that a state not
deny any citizen the "equal protection of the laws." 419
In
particular the government relied on the amendment's section 5,
which states that "Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."420 This
42 1
section is a positive grant of legislative power to Congress.
One of the reasons for the national law at issue in Morrison, the
government
reasoned,
was
Congress's
observation
of
discriminatory stereotypes and a lack of vigorous prosecution by
state authorities of violence against women. The law thus was a
method of enforcing the equal protection guarantee, the
government concluded. 422 The Court rejected this argument,
however, because of a lack of "congruence" between the perceived
harm and the remedy that Congress employed. 423 Although the
Fourteenth Amendment restricts only state governments, not
private citizens, 424 the Violence Against Women Act worked in
the opposite fashion-it provided for a civil remedy against
private persons who commit violence but not against lax state or
425
local governmental officials.
Although the Rehnquist Court's Fourteenth Amendment
analysis may seem as hostile as its commerce power precedent,
Morrison does reveal a glimmer of hope for national laws. Had
the Violence Against Women Act provided a remedy against
police or prosecutors, the rhetoric of Morrison would seem to
justify it.
It is true, of course, that Congress could not
constitutionally require a state to pursue specific criminal
prosecutions, by virtue of the well-established precedent that

418 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
419 Id. § 1.
420 Id. § 5.
421 See United States v. Morrison,

529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
422 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-21.
423 See id. at 665.
424 See id. at 621-23 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)).
4215 See id. at 626 (discussing the effect of the Violence Against Women Act, 42
U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)).
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prosecution is discretionary. 426 There might be more hope,
however, for a law that required state or local governments to
establish special procedures or safeguards for handling claims of
violence against women, especially in localities where there has
427
been a history of lax prosecution.
One should not expect that there are alternative
constitutional authorities for all, or even most, congressional
statutes that serve social justice. The enumeration of powers in
the Constitution's Article I does not include the power to craft a
more just society. 428 Novel arguments-such as that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was a valid exercise of Congress's powers over
war and foreign affairs because it garnered international support
for the United States during the Cold War against
Communism 42 9 -might seem as unacceptably "attenuated" to
skeptical judges as supposed links to interstate commerce. In
particular, it seems difficult to find an enumerated power that
fits the environmental laws any better than the commerce
power. Notably, the government did not attempt an alternative
constitutional argument in SWANCC. But Morrison showed
that the power to regulate commerce among the states might not
be the only means of supporting social justice legislation, as long
as it is drafted with close attention to the alternative power.
B.

Unenumerated Powers

Second, congressional authority might be supported by
unenumerated powers. At first blush, such an idea may seem
preposterous. After all, since Chief Justice Marshall wrote in
Marbury v. Madison43 0 that "the powers of the legislature are
defined and limited,"431 the Supreme Court has steadfastly
maintained that every law enacted by Congress must be based
426

See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 846-47 (1985) (denying relief for

a plaintiff that alleged a failure to enforce food and drug laws).
427 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 336-37 (1966)
(upholding voting requirements imposed on South Carolina in response to a finding
that the state had discriminated against African Americans); Ex ParteVirginia, 100
U.S. 339, 346-48 (1879) (upholding criminal punishment of state officials who
intentionally discriminated in jury selection).
428 For a discussion of the debate in the early days of the republic over the
necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, see
SIMON, supra note 21, at 30-31.
429 See Regan, supra note 51, at 602.
430 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
431 Id. at 176.
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on one or more of the authorities listed in Article I of the
Constitution. 432 It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine that
jurists who rejected the government's Commerce Clause
arguments in Morrison and SWANCC would have any patience
with an assertion that Congress may act in ways that are not
enumerated in the Constitution.
But the Supreme Court is not always dismissive of
unenumerated constitutional rights. In the early twentieth
century, at the same time that it limited the scope of national
legislation, the Court similarly restricted state legislation that
diverged too far from its conception of liberty, through the
433
oxymoronically named doctrine of "substantive due process."
The most notorious of these cases was Lochner v. New York, 434
which struck down a state regulation that limited working
hours, through an unenumerated constitutional "liberty of...
contract." 435
The New Deal Court eventually discarded
substantive due process as a restraint on legislation at the same
time that it adopted its more liberal commerce power
jurisprudence 4 36-both changes being consistent with a move
away from libertarianism in favor of allowing government
regulation. 437 The notion of unenumerated or "implied" rights
was soon revived, however, for socially progressive ideas such as
the right to bear children, 438 the right to vote, 439 and, most
controversial today, the right to privacy, including the right to
an abortion. 440 Each of these rights holds only a tenuous tie to
See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 607 (2000).
433 The doctrine began with Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the
Dred Scott decision, in which the Court referred to laws that deprive a person of
liberty or property as outside the "due process of law." Id. at 450.
434 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
435 See id. at 53-54, 58.
43, Compare West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937)
(diverging from precedent and rejecting a substantive due process argument of
freedom of contract in a challenge to a minimum wage for women), with NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (allowing the Commerce Clause
to encompass a national collective bargaining law).
437 See Epstein, supra note 45, at 1451-54 (discussing the New Deal-era belief
in the value of a strong government).
438 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
139 See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
440 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (right to abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (right to privacy includes a right to use
contraceptives).
432
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enumerated constitutional rights, the most famous (or infamous)
explanation being the "penumbra" metaphor in the
establishment, in Griswold v. Connecticut, of a right to
procreative privacy. 441
The Court has not, of course, created a similar doctrine of
implied powers for Congress. Perhaps the closest it has come to
granting extraordinary powers to the national government was
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,442 in which a divided
Court denied to the President the right to seize most of the
nation's steel mills in the midst of a labor strike during the
Korean War. 443 The reason for the distinction between human

rights and congressional powers is, I suggest, the simple matter
that neither the Court nor the nation has ever faced a truly
compelling need to abandon the enumerated powers limitation.
For example, when the Supreme Court in Griswold considered
whether to solidify a right to privacy for contraceptive use, 444 the
advantages of such a human right overshadowed what the Court
probably perceived to be only minor disadvantages at the timeshort-lived opposition from the few states that actively outlawed
contraceptives. 445 By contrast, establishing an implied power for
the national government, as in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, held
out the prospect of creating a monster of unchecked power in
return for only a short-term gain. 446 If, however, the balance of

costs and benefits were to shift at some time in the future, the
Court might be more willing to imply an unenumerated national
power.
441

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483, 484, 499.

442 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
443 Id. at 588-89. Had the case been resolved the other way, in the midst of both
the Korean War and the Cold War, it is distinctly possible that the President, and
perhaps Congress, may have been emboldened to take even greater "emergency"
steps to fight Communism, with a potentially extraordinary effect on American
society.
444 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
445 To the extent that advocates of the right to privacy expected that the right
would be limited and fairly uncontroversial, the later inclusion within this right of
the right to an abortion has made it, ironically, among the most contentious
constitutional issues of American history. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
446 See, e.g., Paul G. Knauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President,
and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REV. 141, 150 (1952). In fact, the 1952 steel
strike ended within two months after the Supreme Court's decision and, by
accounts, did not result in significant national steel shortages. See Mathew N.
Kaplan, Who Will Guard the Guardians? Independent Counsel, State Secrets, &
JudicialReview, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1787, 1842 (1994).
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Consider as an example the following possible scenario: the
Supreme Court might apply its new federalism to strike down
much of the Superfund law. 447 Such a ruling is not unthinkable,
considering that the statute's cleanup requirements on private
landowners 448 do not depend on any link to interstate commerce
and that the law insinuates national control over land and water
use, which SWANCC held to be within the "tradition" of state
and local control. 449 If the frequently criticized Superfund law
fell, control of pollution on land would be returned largely to the
states. If a "race to the bottom" or other factors discouraged
many states from enacting their own vigorous cleanup laws and
if public opinion were galvanized by a revival of toxic "scares"
like those of Times Beach, Missouri, and Love Canal, New York,
in the 1970s and 1980s, the balance of national political opinion
might shift. 450 A later Court might look favorably upon a means
of national
of constitutionally permitting reinstitution
Political
environmental regulation, regardless of tradition.
pressure, after all, may have played a large role in moving the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the commerce power in the
late 1930s. 45 ' If it were problematic to overturn recent Supreme
Court precedent under the Commerce Clause, it is conceivable
that a later Court could turn to an implied or unenumerated
authority in order to allow Congress to respond to a pressing
national dilemma. Acknowledgement of an unenumerated power
would also have the benefit of frankness and candor, which have
often been lacking in the government's commerce power
arguments over the past century. 452 Establishment of an implied
congressional power to protect human environmental safety,

4,1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).

448 See id. § 9606 (a) (granting to the President the authority to order a private
party to perform a cleanup).
449 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
450 See, e.g., GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH 228-35 (1995)
(discussing Times Beach and Love Canal). The fact that commentators such as
Easterbrook have said that public reaction was overblown does not change the
galvanizing public response to such scares.
451 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 214-15 (3d ed.
1996) (discussing the pressures on the Court).
452 See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. 166-73 (criticizing the administrative
transformation of the term "navigable waters" to the protection of migratory birds);
Regan, supra note 51, at 595-602 (criticizing the strained interstate commerce
arguments made in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)).
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perhaps located in a penumbra of Article I's reference to the
"general Welfare,"45 3 might seem as wise as, and perhaps
less
contrived than, what the Court did between 1937 and 1995shoehorn social welfare legislation into the Constitution through
the Commerce Clause.
C.

ConstitutionalAmendment
If public opinion were indeed emboldened by a perceived
crisis that could be resolved only by national legislation outside
of the commerce power, the most straightforward solution would
be to amend the Constitution. Because the Constitution forms
the foundation for all of American law, 454 changes to this
framework should be made only reluctantly, deliberately, and
when other solutions are found wanting. 455 Indeed, through the
requirements of a two-thirds majority to convene a constitutional
convention and a three-quarters majority of states to ratify a
proposed amendment, 456 the drafters ensured that the United
States Constitution could not be changed at whim.
No
amendment has been both proposed and ratified since 1971,
when the national voting age was lowered to eighteen years;
even the broadly accepted principle of gender equality has not
been enshrined through the still-pending proposed "equal rights
amendment." 457 Short-lived efforts to adopt amendments on
dubious topics such as flag-burning 458 and changing rules for
congressional succession after the events of September 11,
2001, 459 show plainly the potential dangers of using the
amendment process to solidify ephemeral desires.
Yet a constitutional amendment remains the most forthright
means of transforming a strong nationwide desire for
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
U5:3
4,'4 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("[A] written
constitution ... is . . . one of the fundamental principles of our society.").

15 5 See id. (stating that a constitution is "unchangeable by ordinary means").
456 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
157 See STONE ET AL., supra note 451, at 742 (discussing the proposed gender
equality amendment, which was approved by Congress in 1972).
458 See Richard C. Demerle, Note, The New Scylla and Charybdis: Student
Speech vs. Student Safety After Columbine, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 428, 432 n.40
(2001) (discussing the various attempts to ban flag burning by constitutional
amendment).
45'9 See, e.g., Baird Asks Formation of Panel for Congressional Succession,
CONGRESSDAILY/A.M. (Mar. 8, 2002) (discussing a congressional proposal to change
the makeup of Congress after a terrorist attack), availableat 2002 WL 11269484.
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fundamental change into law, particularly in the realm of such
inherently constitutional matters as the relations between
national and state governments.
To the extent that public
welfare laws are imperiled by today's federalism, they stand
precariously because of a weakness in the Constitution itself.
For all their wisdom in establishing a stable form of government
based on checks, balances, and a mixture of democratic and
republican virtues, 460 the eighteenth century drafters simply did
not anticipate the modern desire for a range of national powers
greater than those spooned out in Article I. If there is indeed a
near-nationwide consensus for strong national laws governing,
for example, pollution control or outlawing race and sex
discrimination, it is a failing of our national Constitution that it
461
does not clearly provide for such powers.
How could the Constitution be amended to remedy this
failing? The Rehnquist Court has warned against the perils of
reading the Constitution so as to provide for a national "plenary
police power." 462 Under most state law interpretations, the
police power is a sanction to enact nearly any law, as long as it is
couched in terms of supporting the general public welfare and
does not violate an individual right. 463 A constitutional revision
would not have to be so broad. Reconsider the scenario in which
the Court has struck down the Superfund law, with the eventual
result of nationwide dissatisfaction. Under pressure to provide
for an effective means for handling pollution, politicians at both
the national and state level might realize the benefits of
amending the Constitution to provide for national authority,
which would hold the additional benefit of providing a "level
playing field" for businesses in all the states. Two-thirds of
Congress and three-quarters of the state legislatures might
warm to an amendment that gave Congress the power to "protect

460 See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 451, at 1-20 (discussing the drafters'
intentions and balances).
461 Federalists might argue, of course, that there is no such consensus and that,
even if there was, the drafters specifically crafted the Constitution to restrict the
ability of short-lived consensuses from imposing restraints on liberty. See Lessig,
supra note 412, at 192-94 (arguing for a vigorous federalist jurisprudence in order
to fulfill the federalist conception of the framers).
462 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
463 See id.; see also CALLIES ET AL., supra note 29, at 1-4 (noting the great
breadth of the police power to regulate private property).
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the human environment" and to enforce this power by
464
appropriate legislation.
The constitutions of many foreign nations expressly provide
for protection of the environment as a responsibility of
government. 46 5 Although this authority often may be merely
hortatory, it sometimes has legal clout. A fascinating example
arose in India, where pollution was threatening the integrity of
the famous Taj Mahal, a shrine constructed by a Mughal leader
in the eighteenth century.466
Employing constitutional
authority, Indian courts imposed stringent orders to force
polluting cars and factories away from the shrine. 467 Although
the United States typically has not drawn on other nation's
experiences since the age of Jefferson, our nation has also been
proud of being the world's leader in the establishment of
protective environmental laws. 468
A crisis of federalism in
environmental protection might push the United States to seek a
constitutional solution.
D. Avoiding Statutory Contrivances
Finally, the least radical, but perhaps most far-reaching,
new path for nationalism would be to craft public statutes so
that they avoid the vulnerabilities of statutory contrivances that
I have identified.
In the half-century of extreme judicial
deference, Congress and the agencies did not need to pay close
attention to solid construction or to fitting statutes within the
boundaries of the Commerce Clause; they must now do so.
Reconsider the government's situation in SWANCC. Under
the Clean Water Act, Congress granted the Army Corps of
Engineers the authority to regulate the dumping of fill and
dredged material, typically associated with construction
4634Note that the 26th amendment, lowering the voting age to eighteen years
nationwide, was ratified less than four months after approval by Congress. See THE

WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 537 (2002).
4G5 See John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support A Well-Defined
Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International
Law, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283, 314 n.157 (2000) (citing the dozens of nations
that include the environment in their constitutions).
466 See JOSEPH J. THORNKDIKE, JR., THE MAGNIFICENT BUILDERS 281 (1978).
467 See Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 734. For a discussion of the Taj

Mahal litigation, see Ben Boer, The Rise of Environmental Law in the Asian Region,
32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1503, 1517 (1999).
468 See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (referring to the Endangered
Species Act as the strongest species protection measure ever adopted by any nation).
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projects, 469 and to the EPA the power to regulate pollution from
point sources, typically from industrial operations. 470 These
authorities were granted over "navigable waters," 471 which in
turn was defined seemingly contradictorily as "the waters of the
United States," 472 apparently because the drafters wanted to give
the agencies the power to regulate as broadly as possible under
the Commerce Clause. 473
Had Congress crafted a more
forthright statute, however, it could have jettisoned the term
"navigable waters" and its contradictory definition in favor of
covering all actions that "affect interstate commerce," to use
language from Katzenbach v. McClung.474 Such a delineation
would not have had the statutory familiarity of the venerable
term "navigable waters" and would have required the
administrative agencies to interpret "affect interstate commerce"
in a reasoned and workable fashion, but it would have avoided
47
the complications that finally backfired in SWANCC. 5
Similarly, in administering the Clean Water Act, the Army
Corps and EPA could have taken steps to avoid vulnerability.
Pushed to regulate as widely as possible, the Corps' revised
section 404 regulations included within their ambit any
476
intrastate water body that "could" affect interstate commerce.
More specifically, the Corps further noted in its Migratory Bird
Rule that any water that "could" be migratory bird habitat was
included within the Corps' section 404 regulation. 477 While the
Supreme Court in SWANCC did not need to focus on the precise
wording of these provisions, use of the word "could" in effect
relieved the agency of much responsibility to show, by any
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
See id. § 1342(a).
471 Id. §§ 1342(a)(1), 1344(a).
472 Id. § 1362(7).
473 See Funk, supra note 120, at 10746-50 (explaining the legislative history of
Democratic sponsors' desire to give the agencies broad Commerce Clause authority).
474 See 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964) (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy
Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)) (emphasis added).
475 See id. at 304 (upholding congressional regulation in large part because the
business used food that traveled in interstate commerce). If Congress had wanted to
push the extremist logic of Katzenbach to its limits, it could also have extended
coverage to all pollution by any commercial operation that used any good or service
from interstate commerce.
476 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2002).
477 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 163-64 (2001) (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3),
regulating programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (Nov. 13,
1986)).
169
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standard of proof, that the intrastate water did indeed affect
interstate commerce.
A better regulation, by contrast, would require the
government to prove a link between the regulation and
interstate commerce. 478 This link could be established for singlestate waters through hydrologic connections to interstate
waters, 479 through interstate recreation at water bodies such as
Utah's Great Salt Lake, 48 0 or through the water body's support of
interstate commerce that depends on migratory birds. The Army
Corps and the EPA could develop evidence that migratory birds
generate commerce among the states through tourism and
permitted hunting. The regulatory documentation could rely on
the venerable Supreme Court precedent of congressional
authority to protect migratory birds in order to fulfill our treaties
with foreign nations. 48 1 For each instance of application of the
regulation to a specific water body, the agency would document
that migratory birds use the implicated water body or are
reasonably expected to use it in the near future. 482
For
commercial activities, such as the dumping associated with
industrial or real estate construction, regulation would be
justified by the aggregate effect of this activity on migratory
birds, without a need to analyze the effect of the specific
construction project under scrutiny. 483 For those limited number
of water-disturbing activities that are non-commercial, such as
an American Indian subsistence farmer's filling of a pond, the

478 The Corps announced on January 15, 2003, that it was beginning a rule

making process to amend its section 404 regulations and the regulatory definition of
"navigable waters." See Army Corps of Engineers Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Waters of the United
States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1991-98 (proposed Jan. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 33
C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 401).
479 See United States v. Riverside Bavview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-39
(1985) (upholding congressional regulation of waters that are adjacent to truly
navigable waters).
480 See Funk, supra note 120, at 10745 (discussing the Great Salt Lake).
481 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (upholding the MBTA on
treaty-making constitutional grounds).
482 Cf. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687, 691, 708 (1995) (upholding the agency interpretation of the Endangered
Species Act that includes as "take" land-disturbing conduct that "actually kills or
injures" the species by impairing its ability to breed, feed, and shelter, 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.3 (2002)).
483 See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (discussing when it is
permissible to employ the aggregation concept).
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agency's burden would be greater. 4 4 In such cases, a federal
permit would be required only if the site-specific activity
substantially affects interstate bird commerce, such as might be
the case if the pond was an important stop along a migratory
bird route. Closer attention to drafting by Congress and better
administration by the agencies would undoubtedly entail more
work, but such work is necessary to make statutory regimes less
vulnerable in an era of judicial skepticism toward the commerce
power and toward governmental power in general.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's active new federalism is not an
anomaly that will soon dissipate along with little-known statutes
such as the guns-near-schools law or the Violence Against
Women Act. As a close reading of the recent SWANCC decision
shows, the Rehnquist Court's more exacting view of the
Commerce Clause holds ominous potential for a host of national
public welfare statutes that Congress has adopted over the past
half-century with little attention to a supportable link to
interstate commerce. We cannot know which statutory provision
will next wither under the Court's scrutiny, but laws ranging
from the wildlife laws to health and safety legislation to race and
gender protections hold potential constitutional vulnerabilities
that federalists may be eager to exploit.
So far, the Rehnquist Court has failed to develop a coherent
jurisprudence for restricting the commerce power. The Court
has drifted toward a dual federalism that relies far too heavily
on tradition to separate state and national authorities. This
contrivance, especially when it is coupled with a contrived
libertarian ardor, forms a dividing line that is as weak as the
strained nationalist arguments of which the Rehnquist Court
has been so critical.
For nationalists, however, the task ahead should be plain. It
will be unsatisfying and potentially disastrous simply to hope
that inertia and a reluctance to upset expectations will moderate
the Court's zeal in vindicating its new conception of federalism.
Laws that suffer from contrivances in congressional drafting and

484 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609-13 (2000) (indicating that
the Court is more reluctant to aggregate or allow for congressional regulation of
non-economic activity).
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agency construction should be reconsidered, and the links
between regulation and interstate commerce strengthened and
modified where appropriate, as I have explored with the Clean
Water Act. Only through recognition and attention to these
vulnerabilities can advocates of national authority be more
certain that national problems will be resolved successfully by
national solutions.

